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It is with great pleasure that we are publishing the first issue of the *Mountain West Journal of Politics and Policy*, a journal produced by the Political Science community at Colorado State University. The goal of this journal is to include research articles and overviews of research agendas and projects by anyone in our community – faculty, graduate and undergraduate students and alumni, as well as students who produce research papers in political science courses.

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Scotland: Green, But How Just?  
BY RACHEL LENTZ

Introduction
Sustainable development, green economy, and green transitions all sit high at the top of many economists, political scientists, and political representatives list of relatively recent, yet incredibly vital concepts for the future. As cities, states, countries, intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations, and even multinational corporations begin to more seriously address the concept of climate change, it is not only important to monitor the level of “green” policies being promoted, but to juxtapose these green policies against the socioeconomic implications of their implementation, in order to ascertain whether these policies are also “just.”

There is a number of varying ideological preferences revolving around the concept of sustainable development. Some organizations will wholeheartedly back their economic well being above environmental regulations, while others will argue that the environment must take precedence over every other socioeconomic need. So, how can one differentiate amongst competing interpretations and practices in terms of how green and how just they are? In the first part of this article I discuss the analytical scheme and concepts employed to interpret and differentiate amongst green transitions, such as Scotland’s green transition.

By using the fluid typology presented by Hopwood et al. (2005) this article will identify a theoretical means of categorizing green transitions using sustainable development classifications presented by Hopwood et al. It will further utilize such categorizations by presenting and analyzing one instance of green transition, Scotland. This paper will focus mostly on Scotland’s, as a state, green transition policies. A successful implementation of a green transition cannot be complete without a level of justice provided to the workers and communities being displaced through de-carbonization processes. Strict evaluation of policies in place to address the socioeconomic implications of green transitions must also be utilized to fully understand the success or failure of green transitions. Based on not only the green policies of a country, organization, or city, but on the level of justice to workers and communities which they provide, the Hopwood typology allows a comprehensive understanding of how green and just a transition is. As a result, this article employs two research questions. How green is Scotland’s environmental/climate policy? Based on the quality of green transition, is a just transition held to the same level? Scotland is chosen as a means of analysis because they are leading in green transition policies, but further examination of their just transition reveals that their green policies are not representative of their just policies.

In order to answer these questions this article proceeds as follows. First, this article will address the ideals of green transitions, what they mean, and how to visualize their effectiveness. Additionally, the added dimension of just transitions will be discussed in relation to the policies carried out by the state in question. Once it is clear that an institution is partaking in a green transition, what methods, steps, or solutions have they employed to protect those being harmed by the aggressive climate policy being carried out? And finally, how can their legislation be amended to include a significant just transition?

Interpreting Green and Just Transitions

Green Transitions
There are various typologies that can be used to interpret and compare green transitions. (e.g., Clapp and Dauvergne (2011), Tienhaara (2013), Jacobs (2012), or Connelly (2007)). For reasons discussed below, this paper argues that the typology of Hopwood et al. (2005) is the most useful. Hopwood et al. present an analytical scheme for distinguishing amongst various sustainable development approaches, which allows for more comprehensive interpretation and mapping that addresses both greenness and justice. Though Hopwood et al. discusses various sustainable development approaches, this paper utilizes their arguments to discuss green transitions. This is due to the ideal that sustainable development is a culmination of green transition policies.

The analytical scheme that Hopwood et al. use has two axes. Each axis represents a concern in the sustainable development debate. The x-axis is labeled “increasing environmental concerns.” As an institution places more emphasis on environmental regulation, they will move farther right along the x-axis. The y-axis addresses “increasing socioeconomic well-being and equality concerns.” Similarly, as an institution addresses the socioeconomic well-being as well as equality, they move higher up the y-axis (Hopwood et al. 2005, 42).

On the basis of these two axes, or dimensions, the authors identify three main categorizations to help guide the debate. Hopwood et al. (2005) explain that “overlaid on this map are three broad views on the nature of the changes necessary in society's political and economic structures and human–environment relationships to achieve sustainable development” (42). The authors (2005) claim that they generated this typology so that it creates a “broad conceptual framework” and that the classification into groups aims to simplify the analytical process (42). Essentially, those guidelines are a tool to assist the readers by allowing for a simplification of the process of identifying and visualizing differing types of green transitions. However, they remain loose guidelines, allowing for the fluidity of the typology to remain intact.

The first of the three categories that Hopwood et al. present is Status Quo. Those who follow a status quo ideology “recognize the need for change but see neither the environment nor society as facing insuperable problems” (Hopwood et al. 2005, 42). This approach is generally the dominant view of business and governmental entities as they argue that business “is the driver toward sustainability” (Hopwood et al. 2005, 42). The entities that operate under status quo support economic wellbeing as a means of environmental protection and market strategies are assumed to be the solution to the environmental crisis.

The second approach, and the category which represents the middle ground, is Reform. Unlike those who adhere to status quo, reformists are much more likely to accept that there mounting problems, which must be addressed, but because they are centrist in their beliefs, they are less likely to argue that there is in imminent “ecological or social” collapse. (Hopwood et al. 2005, 43). Rather than address deep or systemic environmental and social obstacles, they are more likely to introduce reforms based on “technology, good science and information, modifications to the market and reform of government” (Hopwood et al. 2005, 43). Thus, reformists will be likely emphasize the importance of increased reliance on renewable energy and, therefore, advocate the introduction of policies that will systematically allow for a clean energy transition, most likely through governmental interference. They might also address market institutions by implementing reforms to create “taxes and subsidies changes” (Hopwood et al. 2005, 44).
Finally, rounding out their typology are Transformative ideologies that strongly support the notion of anthropogenic liability for mounting environmental problems. In the words of Hopwood et al. (2005), “transformationists see mounting problems in the environment and/or society as rooted in fundamental features of society today” (45). Ideally, a transformationist would prioritize the solution of environmental and social issues over economic gain and growth. According to Hopwood et al. (2005), an extreme example of a transformationist ideology would be eco-feminist movements due to their beliefs in equality tied to environmental protection.

It is important to note, however, that the authors recognize that there are Status Quo, Reformist, and Transformative ideologies that do not pay attention to equity over environmental concerns or environmental concerns over equity. As a result, they identify an area within their analytical scheme that includes those approaches that seek to combine the two in some fashion, which they refer to as Sustainable Development. Strategies which culminate such a scheme with an end goal of sustainable development can be referred to as green transitions.

Other scholars have also sought to categorize types of sustainable development. For example, Steve Connelly (2007) presents two extreme levels of sustainable development, which happen to mirror Hopwood’s. On one end of the spectrum he places weak sustainable development while, on the other, he places strong sustainable development. Weak SD represents “a more economic approach to sustainable development, choosing to focus greater attention on economic growth” and under strong SD the goals of environmental protection and/or social equality are “top priority” (Connelly 2007).

Similarly, Jacobs (2012) begins with a categorization of standard green growth which is an assertion that economic growth can continue and help decrease environmental impacts simultaneously. Focusing mainly on economic growth, Jacobs’ strong version is not profound enough to be considered Transformative. Rather, his understanding of strong green growth falls in the reform category of Hopwood, suggesting “environmental protection [is] not just compatible with continued economic growth; it could possibly promote it” (Jacobs 2012, 8).

Overall, then, the Hopwood et al. typology is the most comprehensive because of the fluidity it allows. Each of the above sets of approaches can be placed within its analytical parameters, based on their understanding of the importance of environmental protection and regulation, versus their focus on socioeconomic well being and equality. By plotting these differing approaches of sustainable development, green growth and transitions in the Hopwood et al. typology, it provides an example for how to analyze various instances of green transitions, such as Scotland. Moreover, their typology also allows us to physically place various approaches to just transitions.

**Not Only Green, But Just**

As Hopwood et al. suggest the environmental dimension is not the only one to be considered when evaluating sustainable development or a green transition. Theorists must identify the quality of the socioeconomic factors that may be effected by the decision to go green. For example, both workers and the community which they inhabit must be considered and provided with proper transitional plans in order for a transition to be truly just. What kinds of policies may be implemented to protect those most effected by, for example, the closing of a coal fired power plant? Essentially, just transition is the notion that when a state employs techniques to positively remedy the effects of environmental degradation, they must also consider how such strategies will negatively affect the people whom inhabit the state.

The definition of a just transition is also a contested subject. Therefore, a selection of definitions are provided that support the most a fluid hybrid between Hopwood et al.’s most proactive category, Transformative and the center category, Reformist. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) claims, “transformation is not only about phasing out polluting sectors, it is also about new jobs, new industries, new skills, new investment and the opportunity to create a more equal and resilient economy” (International Trade Union Confederation 2017). They suggest that there needs to be a deliberate and conscious effort by the institution to ensure a transition into more “environmentally and socially sustainable jobs” (ITUC 2017). This particular approach lays in the reform category. Additionally, the Labor Network For Sustainability (LNS) (2016) likens the idea of a just transition to Superfund programs and claim that it is necessary to offer financial support, education, and opportunity to the workers that have been displaced by environmental regulation and protection (Labor Network For Sustainability, 2016). Similarly, Lipsitz and Newberry (2017) claim, “a Just Transition does not destroy jobs, it creates hundreds of thousands of new ones; it helps communities keep services and schools, it doesn’t gut them… it fosters public/private partnerships” (1). This particular approach is more transformative.

However, it is important to note, according to Zabin et al. (2016), that not
all jobs classified as “green” and that have been created by environmentally conscious institutions, are “good” jobs. Zabin et al. (2016) insists that in order for a transition to be just, it must allow for the production of a sufficient amount of good jobs. Good jobs focus on the quality of the job and that includes livable wages, good working conditions, benefits, and effectively outline a possible career path for the worker. (Zabin et al. 2016) Attention needs to be paid to the demographics of those receiving the jobs, with specific focus given to disadvantaged communities. Additionally, communities need to be taken care of. Money to protect workers cannot be taken from other institutions such as education. For example, in a case study outlined by Lipsitz and Newberry (2017), the closure of a power plant was met with plans to help rehabilitate the workers being most affected. However, in order to do so, their education systems lost a significant portion of their funding. Therefore, comprehensive transitional programs must be created to address the entirety of the community.

Though each definition of what a just transition entails may vary slightly, most accept the notion that there needs to be community discourse and social dialogue in order to drum up the best possible solution to supporting communities effected by climate change and environmental regulation. Zabin et al. (2016) goes as far as to describe the creation of a “social contract” in order to “manage a transition to a low-carbon economy that both maximizes the benefits of low-carbon economic development and minimizes the risks to working people and disadvantaged communities” (6). Each institution that may be effected by an environmental policy to a low-carbon economy, such as the closure of a power plant, must be directly involved, therefore directly heard. Lipsitz and Newberry (2017) discusses that community discourse is “the key” to creating mass environmental movements (2). The ITUC. (2017) claims there needs to be a significant collaboration between social partners such as unions and governments. This collaboration allows for all groups being directly affected by state led energy transitions to have an equal say in the creation of governmental policies to help transition into a cleaner world. These types of collaborative measures have been proven to be successful for small town communities, such as the Huntley Power Plant that Lipsitz and Newberry describe. However, they must be addressed at larger scales, such as those of Scotland, one of the most ambitious green transitions at this point in time.

How Does It Apply?

Therefore, the question becomes, how does such instances of categorization apply to research concerning Scotland’s green transition? How does Hopwood et al.’s approach help us to interpret whether its green transition is both green and just? In the words of Hopwood et al. (2005), “The concept of sustainable development is the result of the growing awareness of the global links between mounting environmental problems, socio-economic issues to do with poverty and inequality and concerns about a healthy future for humanity… strongly links environmental and socio-economic issues” (39). The question to be addressed is, how much? How green and how just are the transitions being seen today? This paper will see that Scotland is very successful in their green transition. In fact, they are ahead of the curve. However, they are behind in their justice aspects. Different types of growth, different policies, ideological beliefs and means are going to be at odds with each other. This is why sustainable development and green transitions are such an important research target. Identifying what is working and what is not is a valuable means of growth and hope for effective environmental policies. Therefore, it is important to study leaders in green transitions such as Scotland, while also critiquing them so as to hopefully improve means of green transitions in the future.

To evaluate such questions, this article will use original legislation passed by the Scottish Government to identify and further evaluate the steps they have been taking in their green transitions. It will make use of draft legislation to identify the steps Scotland plans to take in the future as they continue along their green transition trajectory. To counter the governmental proceedings, this article will use outside research and comments from third party interest groups, more specifically environmental organizations invested in the Scottish green transition.

Scotland: A Leader in Climate Policy

Devolution

Though technically a member of the United Kingdom, Scotland retains significant self-governance through their own Parliament and Executive. Despite their membership in the UK, a majority of social welfare issues within its borders are under the control and sovereignty of the Scottish Parliament. The technical term for such an arrangement is “devolved government.” The other members of the United Kingdom, besides England, also retain similar powers and provisions under specific acts of the UK Parliament which grant them devolved powers. The Scotland Act of 1998, which grants these powers to Scotland defines ‘devolved’ to mean, “The transfer of powers from a central to a regional authority” (The Scottish Parliament: Visit and Learn). The setup can very easily be juxtaposed to the United States’ system of federalism, in which the states are granted sovereign rights within their borders and possess their own governments.

Under such an arrangement, the Scottish government is “allowed to debate and pass legislation that controls all of Scotland, but only on certain matters including, but not limited to: education, healthcare, environmental regulation, transport, tourism, etc.” (The Scottish Parliament: Visit and Learn). However, what is excluded from their reign are issues of immigration, social security, defense and foreign policy. Such powers are exclusively reserved for the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom’s Parliament.

For the purpose of environmental regulation, it is essential to identify the function and jurisdiction of the devolved government. Issues of environmental regulation and other affairs which affect the environment, such as transportation, are under the control of the Scottish Parliament. Such a fact is not often fully comprehended by scholars or the general public alike, but is important to understanding why Scotland leads the world in climate policy. While Scotland is often grouped with the UK on matters of the environment, it has committed to environmental regulation at a much higher standard than the United Kingdom alone, making them a very interesting subject to study.

Scotland’s Climate Policy

Scotland’s main environmental regulation initiative began in 2009 with the passage of their Climate Change Act which is a sovereign act of Scotland and, thus, different from any other regulations previously being adhered to by the UK government. This particular act outlines various ways of beginning to decarbonize Scotland all together. However, most notable are its targets for emissions reduction which have been set to be at least 80% lower than the baseline by 2050 (The National Archives of the UK). They define the baseline as, net Scottish emissions from the year 1990, which are estimated to be just under 80 MtCO2e (“Scottish Greenhouse Gas Emissions”). Scotland’s ambitious 2050 reduction target has served as a driver for all reductions in Scotland to this date. Also outlined in the original legislation in an interim target to serve as a guiding point on the way to the 2050 Target. By 2020, the Scottish ministers must have successfully completed the necessary policy to ensure a 42% reduction in Scottish emissions (The National Archives
By 2020, the use of landfills for biodegradable municipal waste will be phased out,

By 2020, Scotland will work with farmers so that they know the pH of the soil on a third of their improved land to help increase the efficient use of nitrogen fertilizer,

By 2030, Scotland’s electricity system will be entirely decarbonized,

By 2030, Scotland will be in sync with the UN Sustainable Development Goal of reducing food waste by 50%,

By 2032, Scotland’s woodland cover will increase from around 18% to 21% (The Scottish Government, 2017).

The Scottish plan is far-reaching and applies to various sectors such as the generation of electricity, transportation, forest regulation, waste, and agriculture.

Means and Strategies

There are many proposed means and strategies to ensure their green transition continues along the successful lines it already has. Some examples of strategies to fulfill their plans include,

The Climate Change Act of 2009 also comprehensively provides instructions, guidelines, and suggestions for how to meet such steep goals. Each section of the act discusses important considerations such as advisory functions of professionals in Scotland, the reporting duties of both the private and public realms, and how public bodies must fulfill their duties under the Act in order to decrease emissions (The Scottish Government 2017). Additionally, means of fulfilling these goals are outlined, including ways to increase energy efficiency, a reliance on efficient and clean energy, as well as decreases in waste (The Scottish Government 2017).

However, perhaps most notably, under the Climate Change Act of 2009, Ministers are required to release reports setting out policy improvements before the Scottish Parliament, stating whether annual targets have been met and setting new targets. The most recent was published in January 2017. The new draft (RPP3) is in place to allow Scotland to continue to develop their environmentally friendly transition. The newest publication, though still a draft, has been created to update Scotland’s goals to match those of the Paris Climate Accord. Operating under the slogan of “A Low Carbon Scotland is a Better Scotland,” the new draft plan proposes 170 pages worth of new and improved strategies to continue to decrease carbon emissions in Scotland until 2032 (The Scottish Government 2017). Before this publication, Scotland had already impressed the world by meeting their interim target of 42% by 2020, six years early in 2014. Now, Scotland has a higher goal of 66% reduction by 2032 and are well on their way to meeting that target (The Scottish Government 2017).

Other, more specific goals include, but are not limited to,

- By 2020, the use of landfills for biodegradable municipal waste will be phased out,
- By 2020, Scotland will work with farmers so that they know the pH of the soil on a third of their improved land to help increase the efficient use of nitrogen fertilizer,
- By 2030, Scotland’s electricity system will be entirely decarbonized,
- By 2030, Scotland will be in sync with the UN Sustainable Development Goal of reducing food waste by 50%,
- By 2032, Scotland’s woodland cover will increase from around 18% to 21% (The Scottish Government, 2017).

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Means and Strategies

There are many proposed means and strategies to ensure their green transition continues along the successful lines it already has. Some examples of strategies to fulfill their plans include,
• Scrutiny through the requirement of publishing regular updates to the plan,
• Deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage,
• Required to set out policies and proposals for energy efficiency, energy generation, land use and transport,
• Cross governmental approaches with local government as well as third party interest groups,
• Mandatory reporting from all public bodies to track public sector action and to make policy improvements,
• Participation in the EU Cap-and-Trade program for the trader sector in Scotland,
• Consumption emissions,
• Strict monitoring systems,
• Policy output indicators,
• Phase out diesel and petrol cars completely,
• Establishing 60 million pounds toward low-carbon infrastructure,
• Restoration of 250,000 acres of peat land (The Scottish Government 2017)

Perhaps the most notable change to occur from previous plans is the new employment of the TIMES model for measuring the differing aspects of their green transition. The model, "was developed by the International Energy Agency – Energy Technology System Analysis Programme (IEA-ETSAP) and is a Whole System Energy Model (WSEM). Such models aim to capture the main characteristics of an energy system and the inter-linkages within it." ("New Climate Change Plan” 2017). The model supposedly combines a technical engineering approach and an economic approach to identify the main characteristics which are effecting the progress of the green transition (“New Climate Change Plan” 2017). The Scottish version of TIMES actually interacts with non-energy sectors such as land use and waste, making it more comprehensive, and inherently more green. It is hoped that the new model will show “investments to be made at any given point in time which represent the lowest overall cost solution to meet demand subject to the constraint of delivering this within the emissions permitted by Scotland’s Climate Change targets” (Environment, Climate Change, and Land Reform Committee 2017).

**Scrutinizing Green Transitions**

However, despite covering a wide spectrum, the program seems to be focused first and foremost on decreasing carbon emissions in Scotland.

When scrutinizing green transitions, it is important to identify the actual green quality of the goals. For example, based on Hopwood et al.’s spectrum, how environmentally focused are the goals compared to economic priorities? There are definitely pros and cons to the quality of Scotland’s environmental transformation. So far, Scotland has been extremely successful and is regarded across the UK as being a leader in climate action. Their interim goal, set out in 2009, was met easily through the process of de-carbonization and even the UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC) acknowledges this fact (“Reducing Emissions in Scotland” 2017). The CCC continuously releases progress reports to Parliament as Scotland continues to release new draft plans. In their most recent report, the CCC speculates about the promise of the RPP3 because it proposes little progress past de-carbonization. The CCC is calling for greater policy regarding other environmental barriers, such as the inefficiency of transportation industry. Additionally, they believe that there can be improvements in agriculture and heat as well. They are concerned that the Scottish Parliament is focusing too narrowly on de-carbonization and should therefore expand their interests to other environmental threats. The Committee (“Reducing Emissions in Scotland” 2017) claims in their report,

There have not been significant emission reductions in most sectors outside electricity generation in recent years. More needs to be done, especially in sectors such as transport, agriculture and heat for nonresidential buildings in which little progress is currently being made. Otherwise, Scotland’s ambitious targets will be at risk (7).

It is vital to continue to refer to the original legislation set forth in 2009 to understand that Scotland really is performing well. Based on this, it is rather clear that the quality of their goals are inherently green. Scotland outperforms everyone else in the energy sector but their goals are so ambitious that they have led outside representatives, like the CCC, to argue that they will not be able to continuously meet their goals. However, the RPP3 is not the final plan so the policy changes that organizations such as the CCC are presenting can be considered and implemented. The outside scrutiny is important for the Scottish government to address and knowing their record, they will. The CCC (“Reducing Emissions in Scotland 2017”) suggests that the policies proposed do not hold-up and contain much besides past policy, claiming

The draft Climate Change Plan contains little beyond existing policy and commitments, although there have been some subsequent high-level announcements. Without firm new policies, the reductions in Scottish emissions seen in recent years are unlikely to continue in the 2020s (8).

There does need to be more ambition in other sectors beside energy and carbon
reduction. However, Scotland’s current ambition in energy must remain strong, because they want to eventually increase their emission reduction goal to 90%. The CCC ("Reducing Emissions in Scotland" 2017) claims, “Actual Scottish emissions in 2015 were 48 MtCO2e, a 38% reduction on 1990 levels. Anticipating a further significant drop in power emissions in 2016 due to the closure of Longannet, the proposed 2020 target is in reach but requires greater reductions in sectors other than power” (12). One thought is that as long as the Scottish National Party (SNP) dominates the Parliament – which will probably be awhile since Scottish independence is no where near completion – climate policy will remain at the forefront. For example, a quote directly from the SNP page states, “We will now seek to continue this progress and maintain Scotland’s reputation as a global leader on tackling climate change” (Furby 2017).

Just Transition

As displayed in the above figure of the TIMES model which Scotland has recently employed, it is clear that there are some missing pieces concerning the economy and society section. Energy Service Demands, the social component, does not encompass the status of workers and communities that may be effected by such a transition. For the purpose of evaluating Scotland’s just transitions, both their provisions for workers left behind and communities left behind will be addressed.

When examining the new green transition plans outlined in 2017, there are very minimal mentions of concrete plans to assist the working class. Every mention of creating green jobs for displaced workers in the legislation is extremely vague, only identifying the need to create jobs, but omitting an explicit plan to do so. For example, the draft plan calls for “setting a course that will modernize and transform the economy over the next 15 years while setting us up for almost complete decarbonisation by 2050. This long-term approach enables investors, businesses, communities and households to plan changes well in advance, while realising other important benefits” (The Scottish Government 2017). As the above quote indicates, it seems as though the proposers know there will be changes occurring in the next 15 years, but the only mention of communities adapting is that they will have time to plan for it. There is a limited discussion of long term innovation and creation of new jobs in the new energy sectors, but again, it is not specifically outlined. Additionally, it is not coupled with investment in training programs to assist in the transition.

When the term “training” is used to search within the 170-page plan, there are only 11 matches, with only one instance of actual job training mentioned. The others were about providing training to residential drivers to be green and fuel efficient. Therefore, it is clear that there is a gap in providing education and job training to those most effected by environmental regulations. The Scottish Parliament mentions that they want to boost their economy in order to create high value jobs. The only mention of job training is through their Climate Challenge Fund (CCF) which invests in communities to assist with social and health issues while creating employment and training opportunities (The Scottish Government 2017). Unfortunately, discussion of this program is minimal and the assistance is very narrowly tailored. The CCF is operated as a grant that communities can apply for. However, the main mission of the CCF is to provide funding to communities to help assist Scotland in their de-carbonization process, rather than to assist in job training and community revitalization (“Climate Challenge Fund” 2017). Additionally, communities most effected by Scotland’s commitment to de-carbonization will probably be least likely to apply for the assistance.

This particular transition will inevitably require workers with new skills. Suggesting that a country in full de-carbonization mode will be able to sustain an economy of coal miners and oil rig workers is unrealistic. So, obviously those workers are going to need a place to go. Additionally, the RPP3 outlines an extensive investment in economic development across Scotland, meaning there will need to be technological development as well. The draft climate plan is claiming that the “Scottish Government analysis suggests that for every £100 million spent on energy efficiency improvements in 2017, approximately 1,000 full-time equivalent jobs are supported across the Scottish economy” (The Scottish Government 2017).

However, the question remains, what are those new jobs being created? This is where Scotland is especially weak. They are extremely optimistic concerning their climate regulation, but they are short on concrete plans of action to support their communities and workers in a just transition. For example, the RPP3 claims that, “By 2032, Scotland’s woodland cover will increase from around 18% to 21% of the Scottish land area. These new woodlands will absorb greenhouse gas emissions and provide confidence for the forest products industry to continue to invest in Scotland and create new jobs” (The Scottish Government 2017).

This seems to be an extremely hypothetical situation. They are going to make strides in de-carbonization, this much is evident by how successful they already are. However, are they going to rely on institutions such as the forest product industry to invest in them in order to create new jobs for future industry? So how just is Scotland’s transition? Certainly, there are many provisional and general propositions for a just transition. This is more so than many other countries because, at least, Scotland is identifying the problem. However, civil society organizations, such as Friends of the Earth, Scotland and Communication Workers Union are taking a stand to suggest that maybe Scotland is not as successful as they would like to assume.

The need for action is urgent in order to avert the environmental and economic costs of climate change and to rebalance the economy to one which provides enough decent jobs making things in clean ways… Workers, if losing their job in these sectors, should be able to redevelop to new sectors and opportunities for retraining must be expanded (“Submission from the Just Transition Partnership” 2016).

They go on to claim that, “There has been little planning to ensure the protection of the people most affected, in particular those who work in sectors reliant on fossil fuels” (“Submission from the Just Transition Partnership” 2016). Accordingly, “Scotland has the opportunity to create an example which other nations might follow. However fine words and targets are not sufficient on their own and experience to date shows that the growth of renewable energy generation does not necessarily result in the creation of new manufacturing and engineering capacity and employment in Scotland” (“Submission from the Just Transition Partnership” 2016). This is a succinct summary of the argument being made in this paper. The existing provisions for workers left behind are absolutely not evidence of just transitions, but they should be. In fact, Aitken et al. (2016) criticize the Scottish government’s choice to support international climate justice before fully and significantly implementing it at home. They claim that discussions of justice in Scotland have largely focused on international issues, omitting the important local issues at hand (Aitken et al. 2016). The Just Transition Partnership (the partnership of third party interests) is calling for Scotland to establish a Just Transition Commission as part of their updated plan in order to concretely address the just transition problems facing Scotland (“Submission from the Just Transition Partnership” 2016).
Like workers, it is obvious that there will be communities left behind by the green transition. The most recent example is the closure of the Longannet power plant. It is projected that “over 230 direct jobs and an estimated 1,000 indirect ones could be hit” (Macalister 2016). Clearly, there are communities which are reliant on such a plant and the closure could be detrimental to their survival. Though the closure of the plant marks a step in the right direction for climate protection, it is of great concern for those reliant on the employment in such a plant. Potential provisions include increasing the scope of the Climate Challenge Fund, which is “fully funded by the Scottish Government, [and] supports communities across Scotland to run locally-led projects that reduce local carbon emissions” (The Scottish Government 2017). Since the launch of the fund in 2008, the Scottish Government has granted £75.7 million to 588 communities but the Climate Challenge Fund’s focus remains narrowly tailored to local green transition initiatives, rather than just transition initiatives (The Scottish Government 2017). The only other statement about communities is rather broad and calls for, “a strong, low carbon economy – sharing the benefits across our communities, reducing social inequalities and creating a vibrant climate for innovation, investment and high value jobs” (The Scottish Government 2017).

The Climate Challenge Fund represents a more concrete example of transitional provisions for the communities. It clearly funnels money into the communities affected most by the changing environmental regulations. However, it is clear that a lot of that money goes into green projects rather than supporting the community in their transition. The grant is awarded in five environmental categories including, Energy, Travel, Food, Waste, and an overall panel choice for best project (“Climate Challenge Fund” 2017). For example, the most recent winner of the Energy Grant is an organization that plans to work with ethnic minorities in Edinburgh to increase their home energy efficiency (“Climate Challenge Fund” 2017). Though an honorable initiative, there seem to be few rewards actually given for community revitalization. The fund should consider adding a category specifically for just transition and socioeconomic policies.

**Very Green, Perhaps Not So Just**

Scotland is leading the world in environmental regulations, which is admirable. However, it is clear that they have been significantly influenced by their wish to be environmentally just, that the social justice aspect is slightly lost on them. They have managed to invest more in international justice than justice at home. It is clear that third party organizations are unsatisfied with Scotland’s attempt at a just transition. For example, Friends of Our Earth (2017) are investing a lot of effort and claim that,

> We also know that the transition won’t be successful unless it is fair to workers and communities currently dependent on jobs in oil and gas, and other high carbon sectors… Much of our progress in reducing emissions has been as a result of de-industrialisation, and policies to deliver the low carbon economy have failed to create new manufacturing jobs in Scotland. Meanwhile, job losses as a result of low oil prices are hurting the communities in the North East. If the transition to a low carbon economy is left to market forces, we risk a repeat of the devastating social dislocation and high unemployment experienced as a result of de-industrialisation and coal mine closures.

Additionally, the Green Party in Scotland, a small party that only has 6 representatives in the current Scottish government, is calling for “collaboration between workers, trade unions, industry and governments to manage a shift towards lasting jobs” and claiming, “individuals, communities and the wider Scottish economy are not helped by simply hoping for a return to the past” (Scottish Greens 2016). A very strong statement by the Greens claims, “we need to start measuring the success of our economy not just by looking at GDP but by considering tangible issues such as job security, good health and skills” (Scottish Greens 2016).

**Concluding Comments And Suggestions for Future Research**

Overall, Scotland is not being as proactive as necessary in creating a fully functional green and just transition. However, it is conceivable that the Parliament will react well and form organization and coalitions to solve these issues. All the literature reviewed that concerns just transitions claim coalitions of different interest groups are necessary for a successful just transition. This is exactly what third party organizations such as FOE Scotland and the Communication Workers Union are calling for in future negotiations for Scotland, especially with the idea of
creating a committee specifically for such a cause. However, Scotland is reacting well to such criticisms. For example, in September of 2017 the First Minister of Scotland called to establish a National Investment Bank which is stipulated to have the potential to produce thousands of green jobs in a more concrete manner. As a matter of fact, the current director of Friends of the Earth Scotland claimed, “The new Scottish National Investment Bank could work to help fund the investment that moves us to a low-carbon economy.” Additionally, “if the bank develops the right remit, it could create thousands of green jobs by transforming our transport, heating, housing and electricity” (Cairns 2017).

This is a much more concrete response previous attempts to how to address a green transition in Scotland than what was originally outlined in their provisions. Therefore, it is clear that they are a proactive government. So, as a response, it is possible to place Scotland on the typology discussed in the first section of this paper. They belong in the Reform category seeing as their environmental goals are off the charts, though their social goals are lacking.

There is evidence to suggest that Scotland will take the initiative to address the concerns that societal organizations have suggested. They have been very responsive in the past, as displayed by their significant increase in green policies. Therefore, further research could follow the progression of the Scottish environmental state throughout the final publication of this current plan as well as when new, updated drafts are released in the future. As for the research questions for this paper, it is clear that Scotland’s goals are very environmentally based, but they lack the balance needed for a successful green and just state. The just transition is clearly not held to the same level of importance of the green, de-carbonization policies. There are many ways their legislation can be amended to increase their just transition policies.

Some ideas include adding a sector of the Climate Challenge Fund specifically for community revitalization after the effect of a Scottish de-carbonization policy. It could be beneficial to replace the “Awards Panel Choice” category of the grant with a focus of environmental justice. Also, as third parties have suggested, the Scottish Government should implement a committee for climate justice that includes individuals from all sectors of Scottish interest groups. Such a committee would allow for community involvement in the process of de-carbonization that might serve to protect the interests of those being directly affected. Such a committee may also commit time and resources to educating the public about the benefits of a green transition in their community and their plans for justice to the workers.

For example, the LNS (2016) suggests education about green transitions will make them much more successful. They claim, “It’s no easy task to talk about transition with the workers and communities impacted… it is critical to have these conversations” (Labor Network For Sustainability 2016). They further build their argument by suggesting, “When it is contextualized for people it works: ‘People will embrace the frame if it’s meaningful to them’” (Labor Network For Sustainability 2016). Such a statement supports the understanding that transparency and communication will be vital to ensuring Scotland implements proper strategies for a green, and just transition.

References


A Fictional Application of International Relations Theory: The Game of Thrones White Walker Invasion

BY MEGAN PARISH

Background

George R.R. Martin’s A Song of Ice and Fire is one of the most celebrated book and television series of our generation, and possibly in all of history. As the show approaches its final season, fans are yearning to know how it will end. Up until this point in the books and season six of the show, the focus has been on which leader, and house, will ultimately assume the Iron Throne, making them the supreme authority over Westeros. Each competing house represents a state, which has seen many pursued alliances, succumbed to betrayals and scandals, and engaged in military battles. Though the show started out with a handful of top houses, each with a leader that was seemingly a worthy contender for the Iron Throne, it is now down to three:

1. House Stark led by Jon Snow, who currently has control of the North.
2. House Lannister led by Queen Cersei who currently holds the Iron Throne.
3. House Targaryen led by Daenerys Targaryen, who has support from many houses in Essos in her effort to take the Iron Thrones from Cersei.

However, as the show has progressed, the viewers have also watched a threat evolve that has the potential to obliterate the entire realm regardless of one’s house affiliation—the white walker army and their ruler, the Night King. By real world terms they can be thought of as an army of zombies, but stronger and harder to kill, that were created and are controlled by the Night King. Normally, these beings dwell in the Game of Thrones equivalent of the Arctic Circle and are separated from the rest of civilization by a large wall of ice, but as their army has grown and the Night King acquired one of Daenerys’ dragons, they broke down the wall and are now starting to march on the living world. Jon Snow is the only person in the realm to know the extent of this threat, as he was head of the Night’s Watch, a group of men that defends the northern Wall, and has traveled north and seen the white walker’s army many times.

Introduction

In the seventh season of Game of Thrones, the focus shifted to the undead white walker army, which now presents a real threat to the entire realm and the lives of the citizens within it, though they were thought to be a myth (Martin, Garcilia, and Antonsson 2014). In the final episode of the series’ penultimate season, Jon Snow calls a meeting of all the great houses, or “states,” though they are at war; in a 2017 interview, Director Jeremy Podeswa stated that this meeting served as, “the equivalent of a Game of Thrones G8 Summit.” During this high-tension meeting, Jon Snow presents a captured white walker before the leaders, to discuss the impending threat (Weiss, Benioff, and Martin 2017). His goal is to convince the tyrannical Queen Cersei that the threat is real, and that it should be of greater concern than the current war between states. The result of this meeting was that Cersei essentially deceived Jon and the other leaders into believing that she will work together with them to defeat the Night King, which the viewer later learns that she has no intent of following through on (Weiss, Benioff, and Martin 2017).

Though it has always been obvious in Game of Thrones that these two leaders have
radically different views on how to lead, these events crystallized the extent of their differences. No matter if the Night King ends up annihilating the entire realm or not, at the end of the day either Jon or Cersei’s states will be in the fight for longer. This may cause the viewer to question why are their approaches so different, and furthermore, which one will prove victorious? International Relations provides scholars with a systematic way to analyze the world and its conflicts through different lenses, and it can explain why Jon and Cersei have such different agendas as leaders, and specifically why they have such different views on the value of collaborating against the white walker threat. By analyzing Cersei’s reaction to Jon’s proposition and the white walker threat through the lens of realism, specifically with the elements of statism, survival, and self-help in mind, we can gain a better understanding of her motives. Similarly, if we investigate Jon’s approach to leadership and the white walkers through the lens of liberalism and its elements of democracy, multilateralism, and functionalism, it becomes evident as to why his leadership approach is vastly different from Cersei’s.

### Realism vs. Liberalism

A scholar analyzing International Relations with realist theory assumes that all states are in conflict through their pursuit of power in an anarchic world with no central authority (Lamy et al.; it is every man for himself. Realist International Relations theory has three main pillars, survival, statism, and self-help. In order for a state to thrive, it must first be able to survive, which the realist would argue is made possible through autonomy and conquest. The element of statism asserts that the state is the primary actor in International Relations, and sovereignty, or having control over its territory, is its defining characteristic (Lamy et al.; furthermore, the more territory a state possesses, the more power it holds. Because there is limited land on earth, states are in constant competition and cannot assume that other states will come to their rescue in the case of disaster, illustrating the element of self-help. Italian diplomat Machiavelli, a prominent early realist thinker, describes the qualities of a realist leader in his book *The Prince*, asserting the idea that because leader’s top priority should be to attain power, they must be masters of deception (2016).

Liberal International Relations theory takes a vastly different approach to foreign affairs; they assume that humans are inherently good, so states will be inclined to cooperate and help one another, thereby avoiding conflict. The economic theory of comparative advantage, first cultivated by David Ricardo in 1817, directly reflects this concept in the context of international trade, in asserting that if states specialize production and cooperate with other states, it will reap greater benefits for all (Ricardo 1817). Like realist theory, liberalism also has key elements, which include parliamentary democracy, multilateralism, and functionalism. Parliamentary democracy is defined by Encyclopedia Britannica as a, “democratic form of government in which the party (or coalition of parties) with the greatest representation in the parliament (legislature) forms the government, its leader becoming prime minister or chancellor” (2018); it is important to note that each Member of Parliament is elected in a general election (The Editors of *Encyclopedia Britannica* 2018). Multilateralism occurs when three or more states cooperate to solve a common issue (Lamy et al. 2016); and was exemplified by former President Woodrow Wilson in his *Fourteen Points* statement at the end of World War I, which called for peace among the nations (1918). Functionalism can be thought of as a product of successful multilateralism; it is the notion that when states cooperate on large matters, it will also spill over into smaller matters and other policy areas (Lamy et al. 2016).

### Realism and the State of Cersei Lannister

Statism is one of the core tenets of realist theory. According to Lamy et al. (2016), realism assumes “the state is the main actor, and sovereignty is its distinguishing trait,” (p. 74). Cersei’s one condition for providing military aid to Jon in the fight against the white walkers was that Jon pledge his loyalty to Cersei, and renounce his title as King in the North. This proposition highlights Cersei’s main concern of sovereignty because if Jon were to agree to this, Cersei would regain land and control of the northern state; however, Jon had already pledged loyalty to Daenerys. Cersei’s visible frustration over this was absolutely justified from the realist perspective because she had now lost her supreme authority over a significant amount of territory, thereby decreasing the power of her state. To counteract this, she purchased 20,000 men from the Golden Company in Essos (Maltz 2017; Benioff, Weiss, and Martin 2017) and intends to send them to regain the lost land while the other houses, including Jon and Daenerys, are absorbed in the fight against the white walkers. If her plan unfolds as intended and she reclaims the land, she will not only regain sovereignty over the territory, she will also regain her lost power.

The realist element of self-help maintains that states will look out for themselves first because they cannot trust one another, which is enhanced by the security dilemma (Lamy et. al. 2016). This is the concept that in an anarchic world where states are in constant competition for limited resources, when one state gains power and security, another loses it; if self-help is a support pillar of realism, the security dilemma can be thought of as its concrete base. Self-help is one explanation for why Cersei did not offer aid even before discovering Jon’s loyalty to Daenerys—the citizens of other states are not her concern. Though many lives in the northern territories are currently at risk, as they are in much closer proximity to the white walkers, the houses in this region are loyal to Jon and therefore, they are not members of the Lannister’s state. Cersei alludes to this idea when she is explaining her deceitful behaviors to her brother, Jamie Lannister, stating, “The Starks and Targaryens have united against us and you want to fight alongside them... Let the Stark boy and his new queen defend the North, we will stay here where we have always been” (Weiss, Benioff, and Martin 2017). As stated earlier, the security dilemma also applies to this situation because not only did Cersei lose power when she lost the North, but additionally when learning that Daenerys possesses three, full-sized, fire breathing dragons, the *Game of Thrones* equivalent of nuclear weapons (Owen 2017).

Another essential component of realism is survival, which Lamy et al. (2016) states, “is a precondition for attaining all other goals” (p. 76). The element of survival assumes that a state’s key concern above all else, even above global threats such as white walkers, is security against the threats of other states. This aspect of realism may have been Cersei’s primary motive for constructing her deceitful plan because when Jaime questions her reasoning, she responds with, “I will say whatever I need to say to ensure the survival of our house” (Weiss, Benioff, and Martin 2017). Daenerys’ dragons are the primary threat to her state through this element of realism, because Cersei believes that once the war against the white walkers is won, Daenerys will turn to destroy Cersei and her state.

Looking at Cersei’s abhorrence to the alliance from a realist perspective, her motives are completely justifiable. The realist element of statism can be seen in her concern for sovereignty and regaining control of Jon’s northern lands. The element of self-help is especially evident, because it is obvious that the safety of other states is not her concern. The unease that the knowledge of Jon’s loyalty, and Daenerys’ dragons, creates for Cersei is justified through the security dilemma. Furthermore, Daenerys and her dragons, especially if the Night King is defeated, pose a very
real threat to the survival of Cersei's state. Thus, the International Relations theory of realism provides an excellent framework for understanding Cersei's motives.

Liberalism and Jon Snow's Democracy

One of the cornerstones of a democratic state is that its leaders are selected by the citizens through free and fair elections (Diamond 2004). This principle applies directly to Jon's current leadership role because, unlike Queen Cersei who acquired the Throne through conquest, he was elected through a democratic process. This occurred in Season 6, Episode 10, when Jon and his sister, Sansa Stark, held a meeting at Winterfell to discuss the impending threat of the white walkers (Benioff and Weiss 2016). At first, many of the houses refused to support Jon in his cause, but this sentiment changes when Lyanna Mormont, head of House Mormont and avid supporter of Jon, concludes a compelling speech, “We know no king in the North besides the one whose last name is Stark...he is my king from this day, until his last day” (Benioff and Weiss 2016). This prompts all the Stark's allied houses, also known as bannermen, to collectively chant, “the King in the North,” and to bend their knee to him, signifying their loyalty to him instead of Queen Cersei. Though this is not a conventional election, it is a wonderful example of parliamentary democracy because the representatives for each northern house unanimously appointed him as their leader.

The aforementioned meeting of the northern houses also exemplifies Jon's affinity for the liberal cornerstone of multilateralism. The liberal element of multilateralism is defined as, “the process by which states work together to solve a common problem” (Lamy et. al. 2016, p. 84); it is centered on cooperation. Evidence of Jon's adherence to multilateralism is found not only in his success in forming an alliance with the wildlings, the inhabitants north of the Wall, but also in his determination to unite the entire realm to fight together against the white walkers. Believing that the white walkers are a fairy tale, many of the other prominent figures in Westeros initially assume Jon is insane, and thus, continue to focus more on the competition for the Iron Throne. These perceptions, and Jon's hope for collective security, are what prompted him to call the meeting with Cersei and the other leaders in Westeros. Jon knows that if they do not cooperate, the potential casualties will be significant; however, if they do cooperate everyone will be better off, consistent with the liberal approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Jon's eagerness for Cersei's cooperation also illustrates his great understanding for the idea of interdependence, or the idea that states are affected by the decisions of other states (Lamy et. al. 2016).

Functionalism, or the concept that, “cooperation should begin with efforts aimed at resolving specific regional or transnational problems...and will lead to cooperation, or spillover, in other policy areas,” (Lamy et. al. 2016, p. 90) is a key concept in liberalism that is best illustrated through Jon's interactions with the wildlings. In Season 5, Episode 8, Jon travels to the wildling's stronghold called Hardhome, where he meets with the leaders of the tribes north of the Wall (Benioff and Weiss 2015). His purpose for assembling this meeting was to attempt to convince wildlings to move south of the Wall, which would not only provide Jon with more fighters, but also save their lives. This meeting is unfortunately interrupted by a white walker attack. However, the wildlings that did survive, agree to fight with Jon.

Though the agreement between Jon and the wildlings only binds them to fighting by Jon's side against the white walkers, the audience sees this support spilling over into several other areas as time progresses. The best examples of this are when they fight alongside Jon in the battle against Ramsay Bolton (Benioff and Weiss 2016), and when the wildlings patrol the Eastwatch castle on the Wall when the white walkers finally invade (Weiss, Benioff, and Martin 2017). In the future, if the white walkers are defeated and cooperation between Jon and the wildlings continues, another potential spillover area would be free trade. This would provide both sides with a much wider variety of resources, will become especially important as the realm is approaching a long winter that will significantly increase scarcity in consumer goods (Benioff and Weiss 2016).

The foundations of liberal International Relations theory include the elements democracy, multilateralism, and functionalism, which are all directly reflected in Jon Snow's leadership. A great example of his democratic leadership is seen when the northern bannermen elect him King in the North during a meeting in the Winterfell castle. Jon's affinity for multilateralism was demonstrated through his initial motive for calling the meeting of all houses, which was to collectively discuss the common threat of the white walkers before creating a plan of action. This element is also seen through his relentless desire to form an alliance with the wildlings. Finally, the liberal element of functionalism is illustrated when Jon's initial cooperation with the wildlings spill over into other areas, namely his state's battle against Ramsay Bolton, and help in patrolling the Wall.

Conclusion

Through International Relations theories, scholars can analyze and view the world through different perspectives, which reveal details that might not have been apparent before. Consequently, these theories provide the ability to better evaluate a leader's decisions (Lamy et. al. 2016). In the penultimate season of Game of Thrones, the white walker invasion became a very real threat that can no longer be avoided. Leading up to, and during, a meeting between the realm's states, visible differences can be seen between Jon Snow and Cersei Lannister's leadership and attitudes towards the impending invasion. Jon's actions and leadership style can be justified through the lens of liberalism and its elements of democracy, multilateralism, and functionalism. In contrast, Cersei's actions can be explained through the lens of realism and its elements of statism, self-help, and survival.

Though the actions of both leaders can be explained with the application of different International Relations theories and their elements, Jon's approach appears more advantageous. Through his democratic leadership and success in uniting many houses and groups that were previously enemies, his state will not only have a much larger and more loyal army to fight the white walkers (and possibly Cersei) but the realm will be more stable in the long run. If the liberal element of functionalism holds true, assuming the white walkers are defeated, it is possible that Jon's cooperation with the wildlings will spill over into even more areas such as free trade, which in return would mean more access to goods during the upcoming long winter.

Though it can be amusing to analyze the motives of our favorite fictional characters through International Relations theories, it is important to remember that these frameworks are rooted in real-world situations. Early International Relations scholars such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, John Locke, Woodrow Wilson, and more, constructed these theories to enable us to better analyze and understand the world around us (Lamy, et. al., 2016). If more scholars began to analyze the decisions of both foreign and domestic leaders through International Relations theories, as done with Jon Snow and Cersei Lannister, new outlooks would emerge. Not only would we gain a completely new perspective on conflicts and resolutions, but we would be better able to understand those who hold different opinions than ours.
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What’s Next? A Critical Analysis of Institutionalized White Supremacy

BY COURTENAY DAUM

Introduction

Critical race and critical legal scholars have produced prolific scholarship that interrogates the mutually constitutive relationships among “neutral” laws, policies and discourses, and construction and maintenance of racial hierarchies in the US (e.g. Alexander 2012; Bell 1980; Cole 2000; Crenshaw 1989; Delgado and Stefancic 2012; Matsuda 1987). For example, in _The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness_, Michelle Alexander (2012) demonstrates how criminal laws that make no mention of race or ethnicity have been constructed and implemented in such a way that they have facilitated the construction of the “blackmancriminal” and mass incarceration of Black individuals. She argues that the criminalization and incarceration of Black males is not an unintended side effect of aggressive drug laws, but rather is the intended consequence of policies designed to perpetuate racial segregation and the maintenance of a permanent Black underclass; hence, the title _The New Jim Crow_. Alexander (2012) writes: “The temptation is to insist that black men ‘choose’ to be criminals...The myth of choice here is seductive, but it should be resisted. African Americans are not significantly more likely to use or sell prohibited drugs than whites, but they are _made_ criminals at drastically higher rates for precisely the same conduct...And the process of making them criminals has produced racial stigma” (197).

In my own work as a critical legal scholar, I interrogate how formal laws and policies intersect with dominant populations’ power, privileges and prejudices to enable selective and/or problematic enforcements of neutral laws in order to criminalize certain populations while simultaneously privileging others (Daum 2015; Daum and Boux 2015). Specifically, I argue that government laws and policies are supplemented by forces of governmentality—the “art of managing things and persons, concerned with tactics, not laws, or as that which uses laws as part of a broader scheme of tactics to achieve certain policy aims” (Butler 2004, 94)—which enable dominant populations to exercise disciplinary power over and on others as mechanisms of governing (Foucault 2007). For example, in “The War on Solicitation and Intersectional Subjectivation: Quality-of-life Policing as a Tool to Control Transgender Populations,” I examined how transwomen of color are regularly profiled as sex workers by law enforcement—a practice that is so common it is referred to as “walking while trans” akin to “driving while Black”—and explained that the selective enforcement of solicitation laws on transwomen of color goes beyond law enforcement’s abuse of its discretionary power to implicate myriad informal and extra-institutional actors who are active or complicit in the sanctioning of these police practices (Daum 2015). In this way, transprofiling is both an abuse of formal state power and a tool of governmentality that enables and empowers average citizens to police public spaces in tandem with institutional actors in order to remove individuals who deviate from the dominant populations’ expectations of normalcy (Daum 2015). These forces of governmentality are significant because they are mechanisms for dominant populations to build and maintain their own power on the backs of people of color, LGBTQ individuals, the socioeconomically marginalized and the intersectionally-subjected among others.

Currently, I am embarking on a new book project—tentatively titled _Institutionalized White Supremacy: Liberal Democracy, Governmentality and White Power in the United States_—that examines how liberal democratic institutions, practices and norms in the US work in tandem with forces of governmentality to facilitate institutionalized White supremacy. This project draws on the aforementioned work of critical legal and race theorists as well as my own prior research on governmentality as a tool of disciplinary power to critically interrogate how liberal democracy enables institutionalized White supremacy. While liberal democracy is premised on equal opportunity to participate in democratic institutions, elections and the marketplace of ideas, in practice dominant populations are able to utilize multiple strategies that undermine access, mitigate critical discourse, and privilege their own interests and power at the expense of racial and ethnic minorities and other marginalized populations via both formal and informal outcomes. Extant racial and economic hierarchies and distributions of political and economic power are insulated from critique by the widely promulgated consensus that liberal democratic norms are fair and equitable, while forces of governmentality ensure the maintenance of the status quo and mitigate against threats to White power.

The discussion below briefly reviews the arguments I intend to develop in the book including a more nuanced discussion of how liberal democratic norms governing public discourse and public deliberation work to constrain the critical discourses of marginalized populations in order to mitigate against the disruption of the status quo and extant power arrangements. Then, I explain and demonstrate how radical democratic practices may provide racial and ethnic minorities with the capacity to disrupt the dominant discourse in pursuit of transformative change.

Institutionalized White Supremacy: Liberal Democracy, Governmentality and White Power in the United States

In _Institutionalized White Supremacy: Liberal Democracy, Governmentality and White Power in the United States_, I will pose and answer three primary questions:

1) What is institutionalized White supremacy?
2) How do liberal democratic institutions, processes and norms work in tandem with forces of governmentality to sustain White power and contribute to institutionalized White supremacy?
3) How might radical democratic tools enable racial and ethnic minorities to disrupt liberal democratic practices and discourses in order to introduce their interests into governing institutions and dominant discourses in the pursuit of transformative change?

Institutionalized White Supremacy

Part One of the book will focus on answering the first question and introduce, define and explore the concept of institutionalized White supremacy. To be clear here, institutionalized White supremacy is not to be confused with White Power movements or activists such as the Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Brotherhood, etc. While these
entities are one facet of institutionalized White supremacy, the myriad forces that work to maintain White power in the US in the twenty-first century include both formal legal, political and economic institutions and socio-cultural norms and practices that go far beyond the actions of a few fringe groups to implicate the full apparatuses of government and society. White Americans regularly benefit from the extant distributions of political and economic power, and while many individuals are resistant to acknowledging the extent to which they are the beneficiaries of systems that privilege and sustain White power it is well past time to critically interrogate and expose how and why institutionalized White supremacy functions in the contemporary US. Specifically, while many scholars have examined how certain policies and norms disadvantage racial and ethnic minorities, more attention needs to be focused on how White individuals benefit from these same policies and norms. To that end, this section of the book will expand on the work of various critical theorists and scholars contributing to Critical White Studies (e.g. Ahmed 2007; Kaufman 2002; Leonardo 2004; Mills 1997, 1998; Young 1990).

The Role of the State and Governmentality in Sustaining White Power

Part Two of the book will examine how racism and White power in the US are institutionalized and sustained via liberal democratic institutions and processes to include the rules governing access and participation, majority and plurality rule, and the legislative and policymaking processes, and then proceed to an analysis of how forces of governmentality supplement these institutional constraints. Together, these practices work to maintain the status quo where White power is cast as an invisible norm, and make it difficult for minority interests to change the system and the associated distributions of power and privilege. For example, institutional constraints include the fact that all citizens are legally entitled to bring their grievances to the courts, but the ability to actually do so is undermined for many individuals by the exorbitant resources that are required to initiate, sustain and win litigation in the courts. As a result, it is the “lakes”—those intersectionally-privileged individuals and institutions to include wealthy whites and corporations—that are better positioned to engage as “repeat players” and manifest as winners in the courts (Galanter 1974). While extant research has demonstrated how the development of civil rights organizations such as the NAACP, ACLU, and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund are able to offset these limitations and expenses by providing individuals with expert support and resources, these groups are still constrained by the limitations of liberal democratic institutions themselves (e.g. Baralay and Fisher 2006; Sarat and Scheingold 2006; Tushnet 1987). Alleged civil rights and/or liberty violations must be located in existing constitutional principles or laws, and these textual guarantees are quite ambiguous and require interpretation by elite, predominantly white, judges (Stubbbs 2016). As such, many “wrongs” are located outside of the protections of the Constitution and federal and state laws, and may not be remedied via litigation at all. These instances of discrimination and mistreatment are operationalized as unfortunate but not illegal, and subsequent attempts to get injustices against marginalized populations codified in local, state and federal laws or constitutional amendments are regularly defeated by predominantly white pluralities or majorities in popular referendums and legislatures. Yet, the fact that these are plurality/majority decisions consistent with the requirements of liberal democracy casts these instances of discrimination as legitimate public deliberations and liberal democracy at work as opposed to institutional and intentional impediments to the equitable treatment of racial and ethnic minorities, the poor, women, LGBTQ individuals, and others. Thus, for example, while activists work to persuade democratic majorities and governing elites to support equal rights for LGBTQ individuals, members of these communities continue to be vulnerable to myriad forms of discrimination because the courts and many legislatures have not prohibited discrimination based on one’s sexual orientation or gender identity.

At the same time, institutional constraints are supplemented by forces of governmentality to include liberal democratic norms governing public discourse. As such, Part Two of Institutionalized White Supremacy will examine how the policing of public spaces and discourses by dominant whites works to mitigate against challenges to the extant governing power structures and paradigms. While the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and expression are universally recognized as essential to self-governance and key facets of any democratic system, dominant populations regularly police public discourse and space in order to undermine at best and exclude at worst critical viewpoints and speech that they do not want to see widely disseminated (Daum 2017). In “Counterpublics and Intersectional Radical Resistance: Agitation as a Mechanism for Transforming the Dominant Discourse,” I argue that dominant interests wield their power and privilege to constitute both the public interest and public space, and then utilize a variety of strategies to undermine any speech that is deemed to run counter to their interests (Daum 2017). Thus, when Black Lives Matter activists state that Black lives matter, many White Americans often counter that all lives matter. This discursive maneuver decenters the interests and concerns of Black Americans in the discourse in favor of an “all” that privileges White interests, and in doing so works to undermine the goals of Black Lives Matter activists one of which is to attract attention to police brutality against Black individuals (Daum 2017, 530). As this example illustrates, when racial and ethnic minorities attempt to challenge the existing distributions of power, policies, and norms that perpetuate the ongoing and systemic marginalization of people color, they often find that the dominant public utilizes expectations about appropriate discursive strategies to mitigate against any challenges to their power. In this way, the discourse of marginalized populations is managed by dominant populations in order to undermine its potency or potential for instigating transformative change.

Radical Democratic Discourse and Strategies as Tools of Resistance

Finally, Part Three of the book presents and analyzes radical democratic practices as mechanisms for advancing the interests of racial and ethnic minorities and facilitating transformative institutional changes. In response to the limitations embedded in liberal democratic institutions, processes, and norms that work to disadvantage racial and ethnic minorities, critical theorists and activists have promulgated multiple alternative sites and means of resistance (e.g. Fraser 1990, Laclau and Mouffe 2015, Warner 2002, 2005). Institutionalized White Supremacy will explore how radical democratic practices disrupt extant norms and power arrangements and introduce the interests of racial and ethnic minorities into dominant discourse as articulated and enacted by affected populations. For example, in response to limitations on public discourse, critical theorists have argued that counterpublics are important alternative spaces in which marginalized groups can cultivate their own power and discourses (Fraser 1990; Warner 2002, 2005). Research demonstrates that when counterpublics seek to engage the dominant discourse in pursuit of transformative change in the public, radical democratic strategies that favor agitation over persuasion and counter-positioning over consensus building may be more effective because they make difference visible and disrupt the status quo (Daum 2017). Recognizing that “the master’s tools
In this way, radical democratic discourses are able to make visible those differences that dominant populations would like to remain hidden. While it is challenging to overcome or workaround liberal democratic norms, radical activists have been able to disseminate their messages by explicitly challenging dominant expectations and norms.

Gutiérrez’s outburst at the White House is but one example of the many instances in U.S. history—from the Greensboro sit-ins of 1960 to Tommie Smith and John Carlos’ Black power salute at the 1968 Olympics to Black Lives Matter activists’ refusal to engage in discussions about how all lives matter in order to maintain their distinctive message that Black lives matter and subsequently keep the focus on the state’s mistreatment and violence against Black people—in which racial and ethnic minorities have utilized radical democratic practices and protests to include indecorous speech and behavior to disrupt and challenge liberal democratic norms, discourses and spaces. While many Americans reject the messages, strategies and goals of racial and ethnic minority activists no matter how they articulate their discontents, others are unable to dodge or ignore these potent critiques and may respond by taking steps to acknowledge and understand their own complicity in the maintenance of White power in the US. As such, recognizing that dominant interests are able to undermine the saliency of critical discourses via the imposition of norms of participation created and promulgated by elites, counterpublics that maintain their counter-positioning and refuse to negotiate the content or means of their expression in order to gain access to public discourses and spaces are positioned to disrupt the status quo and attract attention to one’s messages thereby increasing the likelihood that one will be able to facilitate change (Daum 2017). The decision to reject the dominant expectations about appropriate discourse and behavior in public spaces gives marginalized populations the opportunity to raise the saliency of their discontents precisely because they are disrupting and rejecting governing norms, and this is how they gain the attention of dominant interests and introduce their grievances into the dominant discourse.

Finally, I will conclude Institutionalized White Supremacy by examining the viability of radical democratic practices for facilitating actual change in the twenty-first century. While these strategies have disrupted dominant discourse, this does not mean that radical democratic discourse and protest are capable of dismantling and eradicating institutionalized White supremacy in the US. As such, the book will conclude with an examination of how dominant populations adapt their strategies and evolve forces of governmentality in order to respond to threats to their power. In particular, the growing economization of politics may foreclose opportunities for radical democratic imaginaries and/or provide dominant publics and elites with new mechanisms by which to silence and remove antagonistic individuals from public spaces (Brown 2015). Recently, Wendy Brown (2015) argued that the growth of neoliberal reason “is converting the distinctly political character, meaning and operation of democracy’s constituent elements into economic ones” (17), and she warns that “neoliberalism’s hollowing out of contemporary liberal democracy” will imperil “more radical democratic imaginaries” (18). In this way, “neoliberalism’s ‘economization’ of political life and of other heretofore noneconomic spheres and activities” may create new challenges for racial and ethnic minorities seeking to challenge the governing paradigms and distributions of power (Brown 2015, 17).

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Death and Democracy

BY DAVID W. MClIVOR

“The dead are alive in the American polity.”

--Simon Stow

In an age of intensifying political polarization, it might be worthwhile to revisit the relationship between democracy and death. By this, I do not mean the increasing scholarly attention being paid to how democracy itself can die, although that is certainly an important topic in its own right (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). Instead I have in mind the complex question of how democratic societies mourn or memorialize death, suffering, and trauma—and in particular whose losses are honored by whom and how and where public mourning takes place. The question of how democratic societies mourn is a vexing normative and political issue that has accompanied democracy since its origins (Loraux, 1986). However, it seems even more important to reflect on this question at a time when both hate crimes and participation in hate groups are on the rise (Heim, 2018).

A recent example of the politics of mourning might help illustrate the relevance of this topic. In 2014 the newly re-elected government of Victor Orban in Hungary commissioned a memorial statue to be placed in “Liberty Square” in Budapest. The statue depicts the Archangel Gabriel—a symbol of Hungary—being circled overhead by a large eagle resembling the image on the German coat of arms. On the eagle’s ankle is the date “1944” and the inscription at the base of the statue reads “In memory of the victims.” The symbolism is both striking and obvious—the statue depicts an innocent and defenseless Hungary being preyed upon by the overpowering might of the Nazi regime, which invaded Hungary in March of 1944.

However, memorials—unlike the depiction of the Archangel—are rarely innocent, and their oft-times stark simplicity fails to match up to the complexity and ambivalence of their subject matter. In this instance, the purported innocence of Hungarians in the crimes of the Nazis such as the Holocaust does not reflect the fact that the Hungarian government itself passed laws that persecuted and disenfranchised its Jewish population in the years preceding the German invasion. For this reason, the Federation of Jewish Communities in Hungary condemned the statue and boycotted a planned series of national events commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Nazi invasion.

Yet this story—and the politics of mourning—has even more layers, because soon after the erection of the stone monument in Liberty Square a spontaneous public memorial appeared at the base of the statue. Survivors and family members of Holocaust victims placed small stones near the monument, each with the name of someone who was sent to concentration camps from Hungary during the German occupation. Photographs and other mementos of the victims line the fence around the statue, and at one point a cracked mirror was placed directly opposite the statue of Gabriel—representing either a plea for Hungary to look itself in the mirror or a bitter acknowledgment that governments and citizens often prefer a distorted—and purified—image of themselves.

The politics of mourning then, involves the state and its official acts of memorialization, but it also involves the creative rejoinders and responses of citizens themselves engaged in practices of counter-memorialization. The back-and-forth reflects what scholars have referred to as the politics of recognition, whereby societies engage in a struggle over which lives and whose losses will be honored and publicly remembered (Honneth, 1997). Recognition involves both general forms of acknowledgement (such as “citizenship”) and particular forms that speak to differences in experience and social position. In this respect, recognition is both a quest for democratic equality—such as “one person one vote”—and for the acknowledgement of specific differences. In the case of the statue in Liberty Square, the specific experiences of disenfranchisement and violence to which Hungarian Jews were exposed is obscured when the mantle of victim is assumed to apply equally to all Hungarians. Social movements such as the Civil Rights Movement or the more recent Black Lives Matter movement have been motivated in part by the uneven and contested ways in which democratic societies live up these stated ideals of equality, inclusion, and respect.

However, public contestation over memorials such as the statue in Budapest is, by itself, insufficient for attending to and helping to address struggles for democratic recognition. This is due to the tension between acknowledging specific injuries or losses while also attending to a broader, common project that provides a necessary holding space in which particular claims can be located or heard in the first place. Hence there is a significant need for what I have called elsewhere the “democratic work of mourning” (McIvor, 2016). The democratic work of mourning is a normative framework that attempts to capture labors of recognition and repair by which citizens might take a fuller measure of the complexities of public history and identity. The term attempts to capture both the essential procedures of democracy—the “work” of citizens and government agents—but also the values at stake in democratic societies—not merely participation but also equal respect; not merely a commitment to open-ended deliberation but also practices of non-domination. The democratic work of mourning is important both for the sake of approaching a fuller realization of democratic ideals, but also for the ways in which it can empower ordinary citizens—such as those Hungarians who crafted the counter-memorials in Liberty Square—to contest the always imperfect realization of those ideals. Counter-memorials can empower citizens while ensuring that official discourses of loss do not represent the only account of the past. Each of these political motions—towards consensus or towards contestation—are necessarily implicated in the other. At best they are held in active and productive tension, and at worst one pole is honored (equality or acknowledgement; commonality or difference) to the exclusion of the other.

Here, I would like to examine the idea of the democratic work of mourning in light of recent examples such as the Hungarian
of rightness at the expense of demonizing any who might raise a contrarian perspective. The paranoid-schizoid position can be illustrated with an example from the classical tragedy trilogy of Aeschylus—The Oresteia. In the plays, characters such as Agamemnon and Clytemnestra protect their sense of innocence—despite their violent deeds—by splitting their actions and the broader world into a dichotomy of good and evil. In this position of mourning, there is no room for regret or shame, and hence no reason for repair.

To this style of mourning—rigid and defensive—Klein compares a mode of mourning in what she refers to as the “depressive position.” In the depressive position, Klein argues that the subject is able to face down and accept the ambivalence of the lost object—who is neither an angel nor a demon but rather, in Nietzsche’s words, “human, all too human.” Depressive forms of mourning represent a mitigation of cognitive and affective dogmatism, and the overcoming of the defenses through which the subject keeps the complexity and ambivalence of self and other out of conscious awareness. In this respect, depressive mourning opens up a space of potential mediation and a willingness to deal with the complexities attendant to our lived experience. Rather than an insistence on purified or pristine objects of admiration, we are better able to face up to the complex realities of personal identity and social history. In the Oresteia, the son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra—Orestes—is able to face down the complexity of his own violent action, acknowledging, painfully, “the victory is soiled, and has no pride.”

Although Klein’s theory is largely focused on personal dramas of loss and mourning, I argue that we should see it as the kernel of a socio-political account of mourning suitable for democratic societies characterized by pluralism and complexity. Klein shows how deep-seated human tendencies towards purification and demonization can be mobilized politically—often for un-democratic or anti-democratic purposes. Yet Klein also shows that humans have the capacity to overcome rigid binaries of angels and demons, in-group and out-group, in ways that are fundamentally constructive for the democratic politics of recognition. The question then turns to the means and measures of this democratic work of mourning, which I discuss at length elsewhere (McIvor, 2016). Here, again, I want to take on some objections to this idea of democratic mourning, while also outlining some its guiding principles.

The Problems with the Politics of Mourning

If political societies have always been accompanied by discourses and practices of mourning—funeral orations, monuments or memorials to the dead, etc.—this does not necessarily mean that there is a proper politics of mourning. In fact many scholars have argued that mourning is essentially anti-political because—by its very nature—it occludes the ongoing contestations and struggles for power that make up the political as such (Honig, 2013). The language of mourning, it has been argued, frames political struggles in apolitical, humanistic terms. Death is often seen as a unifying and universal experience, and public mourning cynically uses this percep tual tendency by deploying tropes of “unity” and “togetherness” in the wake of tragedy (Stow, 2017). Yet the very language of unity is problematic from the perspective of pluralistic democracies, and mourning discourses can all too easily exclude basic political questions of whose losses matter and whose losses do not.

These objections have merit, but they are shortsighted. They obscure the possibility of more democratic forms of mourning that acknowledge nuance and ambivalence, and they miss all the ways in which citizens—such as the Hungarian citizens in Budapest—can and do participate in the politics of mourning in order to create a fuller and more complex accounting of public history and identity. The latter work creates potential space for mediation and negotiation, which can advance a democratic project of recognition despite the obvious obstacles set against this project.

Another set of objections to the framing of democratic politics in terms of the work of mourning has to do with the implicit values of that work, and the ways in which those values exclude broader and more systemic critiques of existing constitutional democracies. The scholar Robert Meister (2011), for instance, has argued that the liberal, human-rights discourse that has accompanied the so-called “age of apology”—in which dozens of countries transitioned from authoritarian regimes and commissioned Truth and Reconciliation Commissions to investigate episodes of state violence—represents a problematic embrace of neoliberal versions of capitalism. Meister argues that the more basic division between workers and owners, for instance, has been obscured by a human-rights discourse that emphasizes the protection of existing property relations along with the protection of individual bodies.

Meister’s argument resembles similar scholarship in political science that argues that power politics—rather than normative
concerns—are what matter in moments of social uncertainty or transition. For instance, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are often denoted as vehicles for elite compromise rather than actual mechanisms of accountability or justice (Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003/2004). No doubt this can be the case, but it ignores that other forms of transition are often purely instances of elite bargaining, whereas transitions that include a truth and reconciliation focus create a public scaffolding for recognition and repair that can take place months—or even years—after the transition. Norms of recognition can also be forced upon elites—as the case of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission (GTRC) demonstrates. The GTRC was a grassroots-organized truth commission in Greensboro, North Carolina that operated from 2004-2006 in order to investigate the so-called “Greensboro Massacre” of 1979. Although the Greensboro City Council initially refused to participate in or endorse the process, over a decade later the Council issued a public apology for the City’s actions (and inactions) that led to the Massacre and that delegitimized public grievances surrounding race and racism in the city. Without the highly publicized work of the GTRC and subsequent organizing around the themes of its final report, such actions would have been unthinkable. Framing politics in terms of a democratic work of mourning, then, provides signposts for how the (endless) struggle for recognition can take place.

Guiding Principles for a Democratic Politics of Mourning

There is an inevitable and complex politics of mourning in every society. Democracies bear an additional normative burden of mourning insofar as the tendencies to sanctify or purify lost objects can create barriers for the pluralistic work of democratic recognition. In a time of increased nostalgia for a “lost” America, for instance, persecutory mourning tendencies can serve to intensify polarization and make civic collaboration an unlikely—and perhaps even threatening—possibility. If democracies are going to mourn in a more generative or productive way, then, some principles seem worth recommendation.

1. Erase binaries that prevent collaboration. The work of Melanie Klein reminds us that individuals and groups are highly susceptible to simplistic binaries in the face of loss. One sees these binaries operating in the struggle to remove (or preserve) Confederate monuments in the southern United States. Advocates of removal frame opponents as unrepentant racists or relics (or both), whereas advocates of preservation frame opponents as enemies of tradition. Yet racism is a broad—and often unconscious—structural force that reaches far beyond individual racists. And tradition is a layered and complex thing that never speaks in a monotone. The current media framing—and subsequent shouting matches—about these monuments do little to build civic capacity for dealing with the complex issues of race, memory, and tradition. For this reason, it seems encouraging that the City of Durham, North Carolina has apparently learned from the example of its neighbor Greensboro, and is creating a public Commission on Confederate Monuments and Memorials, whose membership will be drawn from interested citizens and which will be charged with gathering public input and a list of recommendations for what to do with existing symbols of the Confederacy in the City and County of Durham (Willets, 2018). This Commission, by necessity, will have to deal with the complex attachments and grievances surrounding the uneven politics of racial recognition and respect in North Carolina.

2. Identify and affirm basic democratic values. Although many binaries feed persecutory cycles of reaction and, even, revenge, there is a basic conflict at stake in the politics of mourning between democratic and non-democratic forms of life. The ideals of democracy—non-domination, equal respect, and critical responsiveness—set the terms by which instances of public mourning can be evaluated. Klein’s depiction of the “depressive position” highlights a socio-psychological orientation that can—under the right conditions—reinforce democratic ideals, and the pursuit of the latter can also facilitate the former. It may seem paradoxical to affirm this binary while eroding others. The resolution—if one can call it that—of this paradox is that democratic values provide a holding space that itself must be honored in order for contestation to take place over the realization or the meaning of those values (McIvor, 2016, 27). Something has to be idealized—Klein calls it the “good object”—in order for the skeptical work of challenging ideals to get off the ground.

3. Reframe mourning—and democracy—as a creative activity. The counter-memorial in Budapest’s Liberty Square reminds us of an important fact—namely, that public mourning—or democracy for that matter—is not the exclusive purview of state agencies or representatives. Other examples such as the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission show that citizens in local communities can take the democratic work of mourning into their own hands, in ways that can have significant effects. The philosopher John Dewey once argued that democracy should be envisioned less as a form of government and more as a form of life (1939). Like any form of life, democracy involves suffering, struggle, and occasions for grief, yet the framing of democracy as an ongoing, creative activity also implies that the work of attending to suffering and grief rests primarily in the hands of ordinary citizens who can collectively make and remake democracy over time.

Conclusion

To see mourning as a necessary part of democracy—and to see democracy in terms of an ongoing, creative struggle for recognition—requires some reframing of familiar ideas, including the idea that grief is a purely private affair or that democracy is primarily the business of the state or its representatives. I have tried to indicate some of the stakes of this conversation and some common objections to this reframing, along with some guiding principles for future study of the politics of mourning and for better, and more democratic, practices of the latter. In moments of heightened violence and tension, it is important to emphasize both the struggles and suffering inherent to political life alongside an emphasis on the mechanisms and meaning of mourning and reparation.

Footnotes

1. Liberty Square is a richly layered place of political memorialization, dating from its history as the site of a prison built by the Austrian empire. The prison was where many Hungarian nationalists were imprisoned or executed during the 19th century revolts against the Hapsburg dynasty. For some sense of the many memorial layers in the park, there are also statues honoring both soldiers from the Soviet Union and the American President Ronald Reagan.

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Abstract

Who cares about the rise of China? Most International Relations scholarship treats China's rise as something of paramount interest to foreign policy-makers inside powerful states. From this view, China poses a potential threat to regional stability in East Asia, the international balance of power more broadly, and the supposedly "liberal" character of the present international order. In this article, I argue that these dominant strategic frames for considering China's rise, while not wrong, lead to an incomplete understanding of how China "matters" in international politics, and for whom. In particular, I suggest the need for an expanded research agenda that pays attention to some underexplored facets of China's rise for citizens inside China, the government and politics of developed nations, and with regards to the future of international law and organization.

Introduction

Nearly twenty years ago, Gerald Segal—one of his generation's most prolific and well-respected commentators on Asian affairs—penned his controversial *Foreign Affairs* article, "Does China Matter?" "No, it is not a silly question," he began, "merely one that is not asked enough" (Segal 1999, 24). Segal's ambition was to dispel the notion that China was a truly transformative power in world politics, insisting instead that Beijing's leaders were in charge of a middling power at best, with little potential to reshape the fundamental contours of the international system. Western nations were doing themselves a huge disservice by inflating China's geopolitical significance, Segal argued, because treating China with undeserved reverence could only serve to complicate the task of integrating China into the extant international community. Although discussion of China's rise has continued without abatement since Segal's time of writing, conventional wisdom in academia and most national foreign policy establishments has solidified against his central contention. China has continued to grow in economic and military clout to the point where Beijing is now almost universally deemed to "matter" an awful lot in world politics. Even if China is a "fragile" or "partial" power along some dimensions (Shirk 2008; Shambaugh 2013), the country seems destined to attain *bona fide* great power status—indeed, *superpower* status—in the coming decades. This is true both in terms of traditional measures of state power such as military spending and in terms of China's visible influence—that is, its concrete diplomatic achievements on the world stage. Indeed, along with climate change, China's rise often is regarded as the defining international development of the present world-historical era.

In this article, I argue for a reformulation and restatement of Segal's provocative question: not "does China matter?" but rather "how does China matter, and for whom?" In the field of International Relations, China's rise has mostly been couched alongside the presumed (relative) decline of the United States and framed in terms of an impending power-transition between two potential hegemonic powers. In public policy circles, too, foreign-policy elites tend to view China's rise as a geopolitical contest between the world's most powerful states, with the focus being on how China's interactions with its supposed rivals—especially the US and its allies—will affect international security, the global balance of power, and the future of international organization. Of course, these are understandable preoccupations for those charged with making foreign policy. But they are not the only—or even the most important—dimensions along which China's rise will "matter" to most people the world over. On the contrary, these dominant framings of China's rise miss some highly significant empirical realities that should properly be considered integral to major shifts in power between states, and which might be of keen interest to a range of international actors even if not Western national security practitioners: social justice activists, aid and development workers, and others. In what follows, I canvass some of these under-explored implications of China's rise and suggest ways in which the academic study of International Relations could and should help bring them to light.

China's Rise: The Conventional View

For the most part, scholars of international security have focused on three (related) aspects of China's rise: (1) regional security in East Asia; (2) the future of great power relations on the global stage; and (3) implications for the configuration of international order. First, analysts expect that China's rise will upset the geopolitical balance that currently exists in East Asia. In particular, the rise of China is thought to pose a threat to the hub-and-spoke system of alliances put in place by the US during the early Cold War period (Goh 2008). It is possible, for example, that some regional powers will decide to break with the US and instead "bandwagon" with China (Ross 2006; Chung 2009/2010), thereby creating a dangerous zero-sum contest between Beijing and Washington reminiscent of the US-Soviet competition for allies and subordinates during the Cold War era. Alternatively, a Chinese bid for hegemony in East Asia could provoke an aggressive "balancing" response from Japan, South Korea, and other US-aligned governments, with the potential for a military showdown over contested territory in the East or South China Seas (Christensen 1999; Ross 2006; Chung 2009/2010). Neither outcome bodes well for the future of regional stability and so, viewed in this light, the issue of China's rise is best understood as a problem of how to avoid a major conflagration in the Western Pacific; China is a country that must be "managed," "contained," or otherwise controlled lest it be allowed to drag the rest of East Asia towards war.²

Then there is the question of how China's rise will impact US-China relations beyond the East Asian theatre. Often, this topic is
discussed in terms of an impending power-transition between the US (as a declining hegemon) and China (as a rising power). Even according to optimists, international history records precious few instances of a rising state enjoying peaceful relations with existing world powers but is replete with instances of rising and established states descending into conflict, including World War. Can leaders in the 21st century avoid this trap? Can declining states like the US and rising powers like China be made to “get along” in international politics? And even if so, how can relations be kept on a peaceful footing? Scholars have attempted to answer these questions by debating whether China is a “revisionist” or “status quo” power (e.g., Johnston 2003), interrogating China’s stated intentions for “peaceful rise” (e.g., Buzan 2010), and exploring the mechanisms that might exist to diffuse tensions between the US and China (Goldstein 2015; Glaser 2015; Allison 2017). Conceptualizing the rise of China in terms of a power-transition between the US and China shifts the focus away from the Asia-Pacific as a discrete geopolitical theater and towards the international system as a whole. In doing so, the stakes get much higher: viewed in the context of a global power-transition, it is just not the security of the Western Pacific that is at risk from a potential conflict between the US and China, but so too is the security of the entire international community. Indeed, the problem of China’s rise is nothing less than the problem of how to prevent World War III.

Finally, there is the question of how China’s rise will affect international rules and institutions even if relations with the US do remain largely peaceful. For the past 70 years, the US has served as the world’s most important creator and guarantor of international order—underpinning organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and NATO; coordinating multilateral efforts to establish rules and institutions to deal with common problems; and policing the global commons (Ikenberry 2011; Kagan 2013). To be sure, America’s commitment to a rules-based international order has been uneven to say the least. But even withstanding the myriad examples of US disregard for international law and organization, it is still true that the US has been the indispensable linchpin of the “liberal” international order. Assuming that China one day becomes dominant in international affairs, will Beijing simply accept the panoply of rules and institutions put in place by the US? Or will China’s leaders seek to change the global rulebook to suit its own needs and wants, just as the US did after 1945? Some predict a new

Chinese world order—arguing that rising states always, without exception, move to institute international rules and organizations that fit with their own interests (Jacques 2012; Mearsheimer 2014). Others argue that the liberal world order is robust enough to withstand the challenge of China’s rise (Ikenberry 2018). Still others contend that we are in for a decentralized, multipolar world in which no single version of international order is able to prevail (Kupchan 2012). While the precise fate of international order in the shadow of China’s rise remains to be seen, China has already revealed itself to be something of an “institution-builder” and not just an “institution-joiner” (Ren 2016). The implications of its future order-building will be watched with great interest by China-watchers in Washington, DC and other Western capitals.

Reframing China’s Rise

Combined, these three mainstream framings of China’s rise contribute to particular strategic ideas held by international public policymakers about geopolitical change. Most importantly, states such as China are thought to “matter” insofar as they have the potential to clash with extant powers. By extension, shifts in the distribution of power between leading states are considered potentially dangerous—and ought to command the utmost attention of national security experts—because they have the potential to push great powers towards war or otherwise usher in radical changes to international order. Commensurate with this focus on the interests of powerful states, most scholars of and commentators on China’s rise regard the international system—and, in particular, the core of the international system—as the primary site upon which rising and established powers take aim at one another. In sum: China’s rise is a “contest for supremacy” (Friedberg 2011). There is nothing inherently wrong with these dominant frames for viewing China’s rise. Indeed, if International Relations scholars and public policy-makers were not drawing attention to the implications of China’s rise for war, peace, and international organization then they would be guilty of great negligence. Even so, the conventional ways of thinking about China offer only a partial view of the coming global turn, leaving several dimensions of shifting power overlooked. In particular, mainstream perspectives on China’s rise have mostly neglected to consider the interests of actors in world politics other than those of powerful states. In what follows, I canvass some of these overlooked implications of China’s rise—inside China, abroad, and in terms of the structure of world order—and suggest some avenues via which International Relations scholars might explore them.

The first way to refocus attention on China’s rise is to consider the human security of Chinese themselves. It is common knowledge that China’s meteoric economic growth has resulted in increased levels of human security for many inside China. Because of the country’s long period of sustained economic growth, millions of people have been lifted out of poverty with all of the benefits that this means for human health, happiness, and material comfort. Begun under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, this upward trajectory for China was more recently encapsulated by President Xi Jinping as the “Chinese Dream” (中国梦), a phrase meant to capture the aspiration of China becoming a fully developed nation by 2049—the centennial of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (Wang 2014). Beyond improving living standards, China’s increase in power—especially its political unification under the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 and its subsequent military consolidation—also put to an end to the long and ignoble history of foreign interventions in Chinese affairs, which had occurred continuously since the mid-1800s and had resulted in egregious transgressions against Chinese sovereignty and independence (Callahan 2006). For the most part, these aspects of China’s rise—the economic prosperity and the political independence—are celebrated by Chinese as positive domestic outcomes of a favourable international shift in power. And instead of treating China’s rise as an unalloyed danger to humanity, International Relations scholars would do well to recognize the normative benefits of Beijing becoming a government more capable of defending and providing for its own people.

That said, the benefits of China’s rise are not being felt equally within China. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that some Chinese have seen their living standards get worse as their country has ascended the international league tables. Workers and peasants alike have suffered the effects of economic dislocation as China’s leaders have pushed an economic policy based on industrialization and urbanization (Hart-Landsburg and Burkett 2005; Shirk 1981). China’s economic development has led to soil erosion and food insecurity for millions of people (Chen 2007). Meanwhile, ethnic and religious minorities in provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang—in addition to the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau—have amassed significant grievances against the central government, proving that China’s political unification and consolidation has not been a panacea.
for all who dwell within its border. And while China-watchers in the West pore over Beijing’s burgeoning defense budgets for evidence of a blue-water navy or “A2/AD” capabilities, the reality is that much of China’s military spending goes toward internal security, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism operations—programs aimed at controlling the bodies of Chinese, not foreigners (Wayne 2007). Viewed in this light, the international rise of China betrays serious social, political, and economic transformations at the domestic level. These transformations directly affect the lives and human security of over 1.3 billion Chinese (roughly 20 percent of the world’s population) but attract scant attention from either Western decision-makers or scholars of International Relations.

Outside of China, the country’s influence is also having mixed effects that are often overlooked by the mainstream International Relations literature. It is becoming increasingly obvious that China’s rise is exerting a magnetic pull that reorients and reorganizes the domestic balance of forces within states not just along its periphery but also further afield. Much of these developments are warmly welcomed by governments eager to reap the benefits of cooperation with China, especially in the economic sphere. China’s insatiable appetite for raw materials, for example, drives economic growth in a lot of countries—as does its status as a potential market for goods and a destination for investment. But while the impact of China upon the relatively poor countries of Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa is fairly well-documented in the field of political science (e.g. Taylor 2006; Ong 2005; Yu 2017; Pan and Lo 2017), comparatively few studies have shed light on the role of China in disrupting the politics and societies of wealthy Western states, despite the fact that several—Australia, for example—have enjoyed considerable economic growth thanks to Chinese demand for its raw materials. In a recent study, I argued that the persistent Eurocentrism of International Relations scholarship is partly to blame for this inattentiveness to China’s role in the domestic affairs of developed nations (Harris 2017); too often, International Relations scholars reflexively treat Western powers as the players in the game of international politics instead of the pawns, despite mounting evidence that Western nations increasingly resemble supplicants in the shadow of China’s rise.

Whatever the reason for ignoring China’s impact upon the domestic politics of Western nations, it is a serious omission that demands remedy. Such redress will have to come sooner or later: as China’s influence becomes more and more readily apparent in the everyday affairs of Western nations, it will become more difficult to sustain the fiction that China’s rise is something happening in the international ether, above the heads of ordinary people, or else in distant geographic locales. In the real world, the question of how to engage with China is already becoming a major dividing line in the politics of several Western countries, including Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and US. On the one side are politicians who see advantage in engaging China—usually in the economic sphere—and so are willing to make concessions to China in political, diplomatic, and sometimes cultural terms. On the other side are those who view China with distrust, or who cynically recognize opportunities to profit from peddling xenophobic, alarmist scaremongering about Beijing’s intrigues. In Australia, for example, the public discourse over China’s growing influence in domestic affairs has taken on an unfortunately alarmist and xenophobic tone (e.g., Hamilton 2018) while, in the US, one need look no further than President Trump to find evidence of political leaders politicizing (or “weaponizing”) China in order to score points at the expense of their opponents.

As yet, however, serious scholars of International Relations scholars have been slow to recognize the growing presence that China exerts in the domestic politics of the West beyond just the outsourcing of jobs. The sooner this lacuna is filled with balanced research on China’s multifaceted presence in Western politics—some of it solicited, some of it unwanted—the better.

Finally, mainstream scholarship has been correct to highlight the implications of China’s rise for international order but it has stopped short of explaining just how far-reaching these changes to the normative character of international society will be, and how the consequences will cascade downwards to effect some of the world’s most vulnerable and marginalized populations. China’s building of new islands in the South China Sea, for example, is widely recognized as posing a grave challenge to the rule of international law in East Asia and the wider world. Beijing has been roundly criticized, for example, for ignoring an unfavorable ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague and for continuing to undertake actions that most governments regard as in violation of international rules. But if a powerful state like China is able to ignore international law and international courts with impunity then this has the potential to undo the entire system of international organization that is currently in place—much in the same way that the League of Nations system was destroyed after the League was shown to be impotent after Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia and Japan’s conquest of Manchuria.

Indeed, all the features of international order at risk from China’s rise, international law is perhaps the most vulnerable—even as it is one of the most understudied features of international order among political scientists, who too often scoff at the notion that international law can have an independent constraining effect on the behavior of states (regarding it instead as epiphenomenal to powerful states’ interests or else an instrument of Euro-American hegemony). The reason that China’s rise poses such a mortal threat to the vast corpus of public international law is that international laws are not made via democratic processes. Some of today’s most important international treaties were put in place before a majority of the world’s nations even existed as independent countries, and many more were instigated by the powerful states (and international non-governmental organizations) of the Global North and pushed upon the less powerful governments of the Global South. Some customary international laws—that is, binding rules of international behavior that emerge through convention and not via a treaty-making process—have existed for centuries yet have never been voted on even once, even if others have since been codified into written treaties. To be blunt, this fundamentally undemocratic nature of public international law means that much of contemporary international law is European and colonial in origin. It is not Chinese, Asian, or post-colonial. All of this raises some complex normative questions about whether China should be expected to uphold a corpus of public international laws that are undemocratic, imperial, and often racist in tone and content. Would it not be better for China to lead a wholesale revision of international law in the name of equality?

Reasonable people can disagree on this question. But the prospect of international law’s future is of critical importance to marginalized actors the world over. For while Eurocentric international law is far from perfect, it is not clear that international rules put in place by the current leadership of Beijing would be any better from the perspective of the powerless. As just one telling example, consider the fate of the international human rights regime, the germs of which can be found in the nineteenth century but which experienced a significant—if punctuated—period of expansion during the twentieth century as Western-based non-governmental organizations entered into alliance with the powerful states of Western Europe and North America, especially the US post-1945 (Hopgood 2013). Although
the contemporary human rights regime is riddled with Eurocentric biases and imperial hangovers (and is certainly witness to flagrant instances of hypocrisy and double-standards from leading Western nations), it is no surprise to find major positive benefits for people around the globe—especially women, ethnic and religious minorities, LGBT people, and other historically vulnerable populations. Today, there can be little doubt that human rights as a global phenomenon is critically dependent upon American power, which means that, as American power erodes, the political space for conceptions of universal human rights to exist (and be exported around the globe) will narrow. Norms of humanitarian intervention might gradually disappear from the international landscape and, as a result, lose their force and applicability in local arenas. Meanwhile, new (perhaps Chinese-backed) rules of international and local behavior might emerge to take their place; already, renewed support for so-called “Westphalian” principles of non-intervention, sovereign inviolability, and territorial integrity have been seen to attend the rise of the BRICS (Ginsburg 2010). In short, the concept of universal human rights is probably less safe in a world where Chinese power eclipses that of the US. The effects of such a change upon peoples’ everyday lives will be dramatic—especially for the most vulnerable in global society (Clark 2011; Hopgood 2013).

Conclusion
China’s rise—like all major shifts in power between states—is not just a question of “high politics” pertaining to the leading states of the international system. After all, influence in the realm of high politics is based, in large part, upon a state’s ability to exert influence over the internal affairs of others. As such, the effects of China’s re-emergence as a preeminent world power will spill over to affect states, sub-state actors, non-state actors, and marginalized populations the world over. Some of these effects will be positive in nature and should be recognized and celebrated by scholars of International Relations. Other implications of China’s rise will spell uncertainty and perhaps even misery for particular groups, especially the already marginalized. I have been able to touch upon only a very few of the possible implications of China’s rise in the preceding discussion. What is clear, however, is that the full panoply of implications of China’s rise have, so far, been under-explored by students of International Relations. This is not to suggest that the extant literature on China’s rise is useless, irrelevant, or ill-conceived; just that there is much more work to be done if practitioners within the discipline are committed to producing knowledge that is of direct relevance to the broadest possible audience. Of course, it will not be easy to shift the attention of China-watchers away from the cynosure of great power conflict. But as China comes to affect the international, domestic, and local politics of states around the world—rich and poor, North and South, developed and undeveloped alike—the full extent of its rise to power will be difficult to ignore. In time, International Relations will be forced to catch up to the reality that China’s rise is here, now, and all around us. Far better for the discipline to begin grappling with those new and future realities sooner rather than later.

Footnotes
1. See also Buzan and Foot 2004.
2. It is common for International Relations scholars and other commentators to compare China to past rising states such as Wilhelmine Germany, with the implicit suggestion being that Beijing’s drive for growth is unjustified, suspicious, and dangerous. See Xiang 2001.
3. The physical security of people in Taiwan can also said to be jeopardized by the growing imbalance in Cross-strait relations.
4. On the other side of the globe, the UK government has actively courted Chinese investment as a way to compensate for cuts to public expenditure on infrastructure. See Harris 2017.
5. Consider, for example, the UK government’s recognition of Chinese “sovereignty” over Tibet in 2008 (London’s official position had previously been that China was “suzerain” over the province), a move that observers regarded as an attempt to curry favor with Beijing.
6. Anti-China politics has a long history in the US. See Trubowitz and seo 2012.
7. This is much truer of civil and political rights than of social and economic rights. I thank Dimitris Stevis for this point.

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Sustainable Economic Development and the Maker Movement in American Cities

BY SUSAN M. OPP

Sustainability is often framed as “…encompassing three interrelated dimensions of economic development, environmental protection, and social equity/justice” (Opp, 2017, p. 286). Cities perceived to be successful in balancing these three competing and sometimes contradictory concerns are often labeled as sustainable cities in the literature. Winning the title of sustainable city is generally believed to be worthy of pursuit and of public investment (Portney, 2013). Many American cities have adopted a number of policies in the quest to be more sustainable. The topic of sustainable cities has remained popular for academics and public officials to study in an attempt to identify best practices and policy lessons (Opp and Saunders, 2013; Portney, 2013).

To date, research on the so-called sustainable cities has provided compelling evidence that the social equity dimension of sustainability is largely missing from the policy landscape and that cities usually struggle to integrate economic development concerns with their environmental sustainability efforts (Opp and Saunders, 2013; Opp and Osgood, 2013; Opp, Osgood, and Rugeley, 2014). In addition to simply struggling to find a healthy balance between economic development pressures with environmental considerations; research also provides evidence that downturns in the local economy can lead even the most sustainable city to pursue unsustainable approaches to economic development (Osgood, Opp, and Bernotsky, 2012; Opp, Osgood, and Rugeley, 2014). This summary article will highlight one area of interest in this tension between economic development and sustainability: the Maker Movement. A brief overview of one case study-Macon Georgia- is highlighted in this review to illustrate how the maker movement is believed to be related to economic development efforts (Koven and Lyons, 2010). Quality of life is usually associated with some of the following types of amenities (Koven and Lyons, 2010; Glaser and Bardo, 1991):

1. Economic Development and Sustainability
   - Business and public officials to study in an attempt to identify best practices and policy lessons (Opp and Saunders, 2013; Portney, 2013).

2. Quality of life is a believed to be a significant aspect of decision making for businesses and people looking to (re)locate. Dating back to at least 1982 it has been argued that quality of life is an important factor for business owners when they decide where to place their business (Koven and Lyons, 2010). Quality of life is usually associated with some of the following types of amenities (Koven and Lyons, 2010; Glaser and Bardo, 1991):
   - a. Entertainment options (restaurants and other recreational amenities)
   - b. Community image and spirit (festivals, community events)
   - c. City appearance
   - d. Housing choices and affordability
   - e. Local government services (public safety, quality K-12 education)

3. Bottom up strategies for economic development include the asset-based development highlighted above, but also include entrepreneurship efforts, cluster development efforts, and broader innovation policies.

a. Entrepreneurship efforts focus on creating new businesses and jobs from within the community rather than focusing on attracting new firms to the community. By approaching economic development through this method it is believed that a community can avoid the negative consequences that have been well documented with traditional “top down” business attraction efforts (Osgood, Opp, and Bernotsky, 2012).

b. Cluster development efforts focus on supporting the development or expansion of interconnected companies in the community or region. It is thought that although these companies may compete amongst each other—they also can cooperate. Clusters can be made up of businesses at all ends of the supply chain and they can work together to minimize and share costs as well as provide a closer buyer and supplier of goods and services. It is believed that cluster-based strategies can provide for sustainability through capitalizing on shared infrastructure needs.

c. Innovation focused economic development is a generic term for an economic development strategy that focuses on developing talent
and developing knowledge with the goal to turn that knowledge and talent into wealth creation. This is a bottom up strategy that focuses on entrepreneurship, technology development, human resources, and creativity. The oft-cited creative class theory fits with this general approach to local economic development (see Florida, 2002).

**The Maker Movement**

The maker movement aligns well with all three of the identified sets of strategies described above. This movement is increasingly being viewed as a potentially lucrative area to focus on as part of a sustainable economic development strategy. Although the actual definition of the maker movement is varied, it is a phrase that is most often used to describe a diverse set of individuals and communities focusing on a do-it-yourself (DIY) approach to product development. Observers believe that the maker movement can lead to potential income streams, jobs, and businesses through the sales of newly manufactured products. Given the reality that most local economic development strategies have jobs and/or wealth creation as their overall goal—this outcome of the maker movement aligns well with most city economic development efforts. The overall maker movement is usually traced to the publication of “Make Magazine” in 2005. This magazine profiled DIY projects for the first time on a national scale and brought the topic into more mainstream awareness. Later in 2005, Etsy emerged as an online platform where DIYers could become entrepreneurs without needing to invest in a storefront or their own website. To date, a variety of public sector officials and groups— including former President Obama— have taken an interest in the maker movement and the role it might play for both economic development and for sustainability goals. Many cities, nonprofits, and institutions of higher education have invested in makerspaces to help support the growth and expansion of this movement in cities across America.

Makerspaces, although varied, generally consist of a physical location that will include access to various types of manufacturing/creating equipment (such as laser cutters, advanced computers, and heavy manufacturing equipment) that would be useful to a potential maker but too expensive for any one person to purchase on their own. The spaces are meant to be shared in the community and will vary in complexity, size, and cost-sharing arrangement. Some makerspaces are developed and managed by nonprofits while other makerspaces have a public institution as a key partner or founder. Cities and Universities are common participants in makerspaces.

**The Makers Movement as a sustainability tool**

Even with the limited information currently available on the makers’ movement and the related makerspaces, it is clear that some relationship between sustainability, economic development, and the makerspaces exists. It is usually the makerspaces themselves and the overall focus on a small-scale entrepreneur that leads observers to conclude the makers’ movement might be a useful sustainable economic development tool for cities. Through the focus on a shared, space, collaboration across a community, and small-scale entrepreneurship it is believed that local governments can use this movement and these spaces to encourage a better economic development approach while simultaneously investing into revitalization of downtowns or mainstreets. Given the lack of centralized or comprehensive information on the maker movement, a case study helps highlight how these makerspaces might relate to local sustainability and economic development concerns.

**Making Macon Sustainable: SparkMacon**

Macon Georgia is not the typical city highlighted for being aggressive in pursuing sustainability in the United States. In fact, being located in a state- Georgia- that is not often identified as being aggressive or even supportive in the pursuit of sustainability makes this an even more interesting case to explore. Macon is located approximately 85 miles south of Atlanta and is home to more than 155,000 residents, 6,000 historic buildings and 14 historic districts (US Census ACS, 2015; Historic Macon, 2017). The residents of the city are primarily racial and ethnic minorities and the city suffers from a high rate of poverty across all populations (US Census ACS, 2015). The city has struggled to emerge from the Great Recession and has experienced a number of employment and business losses over the years that have prompted policymakers to engage in some creative thinking about economic development strategies.

**The emergence of the Makerspace: SparkMacon**

SparkMacon emerged from a collaborative cross-sectoral effort and opened in November 2014 in the city. To obtain the necessary resources to open the shared maker space and to purchase the initial equipment, the participating founders applied for and received a grant from the Georgia Technology Authority (GTA). To supplement that grant and purchase the initial equipment the founders launched a successful crowdfunding campaign (Rosario, 2014). When the makerspace finally opened in downtown Macon it was one of only 30 makerspaces in the state of Georgia and was the only one located in Central Georgia (Thurston, 2015).

Now that SparkMacon has been open for more than three years- the space has expanded to 3,000 square feet of space divided into nine distinct “making” areas ranging from a wood and metal shop to a music studio. To highlight associated educational and social goals, the space also includes a conference area, a classroom, and a lounge area for what they call "creative entrepreneurs" to share ideas and to collaborate on projects. The current mission statement highlights the connection the space is meant to have to local economic development and entrepreneurship efforts.

The mission of SparkMacon is to create a collaborative workspace for a wide range of creatives that meets every stage of entrepreneurship, from ideation to prototyping to manufacturing, by providing an adaptable space for innovation, in-house support, as well as connections to local resources that enable them to make a living doing what they love (SparkMacon Mission, 2017).

As mentioned previously, makerspaces like SparkMacon are believed to align well with sustainable economic development approaches through the focus on entrepreneurship and human resource approaches through the focus on local economic development efforts internally towards current residents and local businesses. This internal focus stands in stark contrast to the more traditional externally focused approach to economic development that has been associated with negative outcomes for many cities including serious environmental externalities (Koven and Lyons, 2010; Opp and Osgood, 2013). Entrepreneurs have been a key part of economic development for decades and has recently expanded into the sustainable development toolkit for cities across the United States by emphasizing local production activities. It is believed that entrepreneurship based on local production has the potential to contribute to sustainability goals through “...reduced transportation needs, lower pollution, more local jobs, local ownership of businesses, and retention of capital in the local
community” (Wheeler and Beatley, 2009, p. 233). SparkMacon is designed to provide the necessary space and educational support for all stages of entrepreneurship from the idea stage to the actual manufacturing process and does so without incentivizing outside businesses to locate to Macon (SparkMacon, 2017). Furthermore, as an even clearer relationship to sustainability, the founders of SparkMacon strategically located the space in downtown Macon with the goal of providing a mechanism to spark downtown revitalization. As the Mayor says, “Our efforts to become the Hub City of Middle Georgia- being a walkable city, attracting people back to Downtown, improving sidewalks and open spaces, encouraging mixed use development- are core tenants of revitalizing a community… and they can help lower our negative impact on the environment” (Floore, 2017). SparkMacon’s location in downtown Macon is no coincidence and fits with the desire to have a walkable and thriving downtown area- both key concerns for sustainability goals.

Economic Impact
Although the economic impact of SparkMacon has not yet been formally assessed; several important related activities have emerged that provide some evidence of the early economic successes this space is having on the community. Perhaps the most direct and traditional connection to economic development goals are the new local businesses that have launched due to the presence of SparkMacon. One such business that has emerged with some help from SparkMacon is the minority-owned custom bow-tie business, BowFRESH (Middle Georgia CEO, 2017). The owner of BowFRESH clearly attributes some of his success to SparkMacon saying publicly that “The space has provided a comfortable atmosphere to make my handcrafted bowties, as well as given me access to amazing technology resources, including a laser cutter and photo editing software” (Middle Georgia CEO, 2017). As a second example, Georgia Artisan is an even clearer example of the economic benefit derived from SparkMacon. The Founder of Georgia Artisan got his start in SparkMacon and now operates his own warehouse employing five people (Personal Communication Osman, 2017).

Conclusions and Next Steps
Makerspaces hold promise for a new approach to local economic development that does not suffer from many of the same shortcomings as the traditional methods criticized by experts everywhere. Macon Georgia is not a likely success story for sustainability, however, the investment and effort put into SparkMacon has shown the first hint of being able to reimagine local economic development through a sustainability lens. Rather than engage in the traditional needs-based externally focused approach to economic development, Macon has been able to focus their efforts internally and on ways that may lead to a better balance between sustainability and economic needs. Although makerspaces are new to the conversations on sustainability in American cities, these spaces are worthy of a renewed look. As retail establishments continue to decline in American cities, these makerspaces may very well fill a need to revitalize downtowns and creatively reuse commercial spaces. These spaces are relatively low-cost, require little upfront investment, and may just provide a unique economic and environmental benefit to a city.

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